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BORDER ISSUES STEERING 
GROUP CHAIR: 
Matthew Norwell 
I am delighted to introduce this report which I hope will provide an insightful, timely and practical 
contribution to the discussion about the impact of Brexit on Kent and Medway. 
I am the chief executive of the Thames Gateway Kent Partnership, a body which brings together the public 
and private sectors in North Kent to promote economic growth and regeneration.
You might ask why a partnership which is largely focused on North Kent has played a part in helping to 
produce a report which – on the surface at least – considers the impact of Brexit on Kent’s Channel ports. 
The reason for this goes to the heart of the interconnectedness of the Kent and Medway economy. What 
affects one part of the county will often very quickly have its impact felt elsewhere in the county. 
Kent and Medway are the UK’s gateway to the rest of Europe (and beyond): the impact of being that 
gateway is felt right across Kent and Medway. It is something that has shaped the area’s heritage, its 
culture and its economy. As we get to grips with the potential impacts of the UK leaving the EU, in 
whatever form that might take, more than anywhere else in England, the immediate consequences will 
most keenly be felt in Kent and Medway.
Society’s reliance on quick, reliable and flexible trade, which depend on long, complex supply chains, small 
inventories and just in time deliveries, puts a burden on Kent and Medway not felt elsewhere. This is not 
simply limited to the area around the Channel ports. Being the main entry point for trade with Europe 
brings with it a number of unique challenges. Too often these are seen as the county’s problem to solve 
alone: whether that means traffic management, lorry parking or security and policing of the border. These 
should be seen as exceptional challenges of national importance, not simply something for Kent and 
Medway to manage as part of the “business as usual”. 
I hope that this final Brexit Impact Assessment report by CEFEUS demonstrates the unique impact that 
being the UK’s principal gateway to the EU has on Kent and Medway. I further hope that national and 
local government alike take notice of the key policy suggestions therein, as well as making a practical 
contribution to the debate about the best way to manage the uncertain times ahead.  
Matthew Norwell is currently the Chief Executive of the Thames Gateway Kent Partnership. The 
partnership It helps to co-ordinate regeneration in North Kent across housing, skills, transport, 
tourism and the cultural, creative and digital industries, promoting and making the case to 
government and the private sector for investment in the area, ensuring that the place is able to 
articulate its collective voice.
 
Matthew has worked across a wide range of local government functions at strategic and operational 
levels at a number of different authorities in London, including Greenwich and Westminster City 
Council, and in central government. 
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Professor Amelia Hadfield  
Director of the Centre for European Studies 
(CEFEUS), Canterbury Christ Church University
A border is a paradox. It represents both internal and external dimensions, areas within and without. A 
border is an invisible and frequently arbitrary marker, as well as a profoundly indicative, even strategic 
location. Above all, a border is the most poignant symbol of all that constitutes a nation-state, in terms 
of its own national identity, and its connection to its neighbours. 
As I write this, in November 2018, the British border has never been more heavily endowed with 
symbolism since the cessation of hostilities that brought to an end World War II. Against the backdrop 
of the June 2016 Referendum, the British border is now a device like no other: highlighting the stark 
divide between itself and its neighbours, between ardent perspectives clamouring to ‘regain control’ 
and those equally vehement that Britain’s relationship with its European neighbours ought to remain 
as closely aligned as possible to the EU. 
From a practical perspective, the British border is a microcosm of the immense network of procedures, 
regulations, directives, protocols and procedures daily undertaken by Britain in its relations with the 
EU, and the world. Getting to grips with the sheer scale of border activity is a challenging goal, and 
for that reason, this final CEFEUS Brexit Impact Assessment Report is the longest yet produced. It 
is also the report that has taken us the longest to assemble, simply because of the sheer range of 
components to be included and the strategic nature of the impacts of the border as a political and 
social reality here in Kent. 
While data-gathering interviews and primary and secondary source analysis began as early as 
November 2016, the protracted political ambiguity in which the UK government finds itself has forced 
us time and again to ‘keep our powder dry’: scheduling, and then rescheduling possible completion 
and launch dates in an attempt to one step ahead of the range Brexit options (i.e. hard and soft, 
Single Market and/or Customs Union, quasi-integrated vs associate status), all of which will have 
profound implications for the sheer degree of change to Britain’s borders. 
We have endeavoured first of all to be clear about the overarching political dynamics comprising this 
most difficult of political times. While the passions that continue to dominate the various arguments 
are now at fever pitch, the procedural method as well as the substantive implications entailed in Britain 
exiting EU remain as indistinct as it did prior to and immediately after the June 2016 Referendum on 
EU Membership. In terms of changes to the UK border, the red lines outlined in Prime Minister May’s 
January 2017 Lancaster House speech remain the most important: namely the proposal that the UK 
leave both the Single Market and the Customs Union. 
In simple terms, this means new checks on goods travelling between the EU and the UK which do not 
exist today: 
• Customs and VAT checks; 
• Compliance checks to support both EU and UK standards, traders and businesses. 
8The British border is therefore the starkest example of the deeply irreconcilable attempt to leave the EU 
politically and simultaneously remain connected to it economically. In terms of producing a manageable 
UK-EU border, the stakes are undoubtedly the highest in Ireland, where there is a very real chance of 
producing political unrest, economic volatility and even a return to the violent past should any new 
physical border point be constructed. But Kent is host to the British border, and here the consequences 
for genuine upheaval across the county are no less real. Here, the UK sits achingly close to its proximate 
European neighbourhours, by virtue of the sheer scale of transit, commercial and tourist activity flowing 
through Dover and Folkestone, the two largest and most concentrated border points between Britain and 
the continent. 
We have therefore worked hard to be clear first, in assessing the current role of the border within the Kent 
community; second, in examining the range of possible impacts to the border and Kent in terms of an 
assumed Brexit-induced shift to non-membership of the Single Market and the Customs Union; third in 
putting forward practical short and medium-term policy suggestions which, given the extreme shortness of 
time, we feel are pertinent to both national and local government. 
The report is divided into five key components: socio-economic context-setting; police and security; freight 
and logistics; border management and customs; plus a series of port profiles. 
In each component, our findings suggest that local actors, both public and private, local government and 
national government already face significant operational challenges at the border on a ‘business as usual 
basis’. Brexit scenarios, based on an assumed shift of the UK from within to without the EU Single Market 
and Customs Union will result in:
• lack of mobility, connection, and access to key resources for the immediate Kent community;
• civil order and policing challenges locally, as well as a visible reduction in the wide range of key 
policing, security and judicial tools that Kent Police, British police forces, security operatives and judicial 
actors currently use in collaboration with European partners under the aegis of the EU, compounded 
by a lack of clarity regarding the UK’s future relationship with the EU;
• real challenges to the strategic road network in Kent arising from bottlenecks at the ports; over-
capacity of HGVs on Kent roads; increased non-designated parking;
• wholesale shifts in terms of border management at Dover and Folkestone in terms of applying a host 
of regulatory checks and customs to goods and passengers alike;
• visible, short, medium and long-term impacts to key UK ports, and also to key UK partner ports in its 
closest neighbours: Calais, Dunkirk, Rotterdam and Zeebrugge.
The report’s policy suggestions are all aimed at improving the overall understanding – particularly 
amongst national decision-makers – of the short-term volatility, the mid-range instability, and the long-
term uncertainty that will undoubtedly be felt across Kent – as a frontline county – and the UK as a 
whole, should effective management not be ensured. To be clear: the changes triggered by Britain leaving 
the EU will be felt first, hardest and longest at the border. The UK government has a clear, undoubted, 
indisputable responsibility to the frontiers of its own state: starting with the complex inter-workings of the 
border itself. 
A report of this nature could simply not have been accomplished without a huge amount of trust, good 
will, cooperation, effort and creativity among all its partners, and at every stage of the game. The Border 
Issues Steering Group has comprised a range of individuals and organisations, who have attended 
meetings, one-on-one interviews, phone and email interviews and questionnaires, as well as our own 
external research trips including Chartered Institute for Logistics and Transport, Ernst and Young, Freight 
Transport Association, GetLink (Eurotunnel), Highways England, HMRC, HM Treasury, the Home Office, 
Kent County Council, Kent Invicta Chamber of Commerce, Kent Police, Kent Resilience Group, Kent Trading 
Standards, King’s College London, Network Rail, Office of the Kent Police and Crime Commissioner, Port of 
Dover, South East Immigration Enforcement, Thames Gateway Kent Partnership, and UK Border Force. Ably 
assisted by its Chair, Matthew Norwell, as well as the key data provided by our own Canterbury Centre 
for Policing Research, CEFEUS staff have worked since late 2016 to produce a balanced, coherent and 
ultimately practical report identifying the range of strategic sectoral impacts specific to the border, within 
the broader Kent and Medway community, arising from the anticipated impact of Brexit.
9To conclude on a personal note, I have thoroughly enjoyed the intellectual and practical demands involved 
in putting this report together, the roles and responsibilities entailed in being the Director of CEFEUS, and 
the opportunity to meet, learn from, and help articulate the myriad essentials of citizens from across the 
Canterbury Christ Church University community, and Kent and Medway as a whole. It’s been a privilege.
No man is an island,
Entire of itself,
Every man is a piece of the continent,
A part of the main.
If a clod be washed away by the sea,
Europe is the less.
As well as if a promontory were.
As well as if a manor of thy friend’s
Or of thine own were:
Any man’s death diminishes me,
Because I am involved in mankind,
And therefore never send to know for whom the bell tolls; 
It tolls for thee. 
John Donne (1624) Meditation 17, Devotions upon Emergent Occasions
 
Professor Amelia Hadfield 
Director, Centre for European Studies 
Canterbury Christ Church University 
With special thanks for the tremendous amount of hard work, creativity and insight: Stephen, Paul, Estelle 
and Susan, as well as the superlative CEFEUS team: Christian, Noora, Fennel and Chris.
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CONTEXT: WHERE ARE WE NOW?
Socio-Economic Context 
We are a community of people who need to move. Mobility gives us access, to goods, opportunities, 
services and social networks, which sustain us and make our lives worth living. Put simply, if we can’t 
access places, we cannot take part in the activities that enable us to participate and feel socially included in 
the society in which we live. 
 
Social inclusion is a priority for communities and politicians in Kent and Medway. The Kent Forum’s Vision 
for Kent 2012-20221 embodies this. Written around three ‘big ambitions’: grow the economy; tackle 
disadvantage; and put the citizen in control, the Vision is a county-wide strategy for the social, economic 
and environmental well-being of our county. Accessibility is fundamental to the achievement of The Vision. 
Our communities need to be able to move: to access education, employment and local businesses, to 
‘grow the economy’; to access health and social care, appropriate housing and social support, to ‘tackle 
disadvantage’; and to access the democratic networks that ‘put the citizen in control’. 
Why is accessibility important to Kent Forum’s Vision 2012-2022? 
 To grow the economy, a functioning county transport network is critical. From a logistical perspective, 
this means that improved functioning of the Strategic Road Network (SRN), our ports and an integrated 
public transport system need to be fit for purpose to create the conditions for economic growth. From a 
policy-based perspective, policies to build skills and careers of Kent’s citizens are dependent upon exposure 
to opportunities and networks both locally and beyond2. Local Authorities for instance propose a range 
of social policies to improve social welfare, such as reducing the number of Kent residents dependent on 
out of work benefits, improving skills and offering training, including Job Centre Plus, an interview with 
a work coach, or to have an assessment for disability support3. However, underlying all these and many 
other policies (e.g. voluntary sector, tourism, etc.) is the critical, practical requirement for basic mobility 
to access the assistance on offer by local authorities like the Kent Forum. Similarly, Kent’s most vulnerable 
communities must be able to access health and social care, family support and adequate housing. But we 
know access to health and social care and social networks are mobility-dependent and that our poorest 
communities tend to be housed in the least accessible estates4. In other words, should accessibility worsen 
across the county – for a range of reasons including Brexit - disadvantage will certainly increase. 
Brexit and County-Based Risks
As this report argues, there is a risk that Brexit border changes will deliver precisely the opposite of the 
Kent Forum’s county-wide ambitions: gridlock on our strategic road network; bottlenecks at our ports; and 
a fractured public transport system due to unreliable journey times on interdependent modes. We know, 
from Operation Stack in 2015, that bottlenecks, overcapacity and increased non-designated parking lead 
to localised climate change, an increase in air, noise and waste pollution and environmental damage to 
verges and local wildlife5. 
Operation Stack must be regarded as a cautionary tale for the local consequences of Brexit; namely, that 
accessibility of all types across the county will worsen with concentrated and prolonged traffic disruption 
arising from poorly-managed changes at the border. A poorly-prepared Brexit poses a genuine risk to 
accessibility, for all of our communities in Kent and Medway, with impacts on policing, freight, transport, 
road logistics, and ports themselves. 
1 http://www.kent.gov.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0003/5475/Vision-for-Kent-2012-2022.pdf 
2 Kenyon, S. 2011. Transport and social exclusion: access to higher education in the UK policy context. Journal of Transport Geography. 19: 4.
3 https://www.jrf.org.uk/report/tackling-transport-related-barriers-employment-low-income-neighbourhoods. 
4 http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100907154242/http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/cabinetoffice/social_exclusion_task_force/ 
 assets/publications_1997_to_2006/making_transport_2003.pdf.
5 https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmtrans/65/65.pdf. 
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Without a swift re-focus on the impacts of Brexit on accessibility for our local communities, not only 
will Kent’s Local Authorities be unable to achieve the vision of enhancing the social, economic and 
environmental well-being of our county, they risk the very real threat of a drop-off in overall categories of 
well-being across our county. 
For citizens of Kent, the key point is that reduced accessibility directly causes disadvantage6. 
Policy Suggestions 
It is essential that central and local governments act now, to prepare for the economic, social and 
environmental impacts highlighted above. The following activities are aimed at both national and local 
government alike to implement, to mitigate the range of identifiable negative consequences arising from 
Brexit: 
 
1. Understand the impacts of transport disruption for accessibility in our local communities. We welcome 
work already undertaken by Kent County Council and Dover District Council to understand the likely 
impacts of Brexit for our local economy, businesses and workforce, local healthcare provision, local 
policing and local traffic management7. We urge that work now turns to mapping local accessibility, 
under different scenarios. 
2. Ensure that the accessibility impacts of Brexit border changes are factored into all social policy 
decisions. For example, the East Kent Clinical Commissioning Groups are currently consulting on 
options for the restructuring of urgent, emergency and acute medical care in East Kent. Options under 
consideration include the centralisation of care, such that each of our main hospitals will offer only 
one of these three types of care8. It is essential that the potential impacts of reduced accessibility are 
considered in the equality impact assessments for all restructuring options. 
3. Plan for behaviour change from 2019 onwards, both short and long term. Individuals’ travel behaviour 
results from a complex interplay of factors9. Historically, it is challenging to persuade people to 
change their travel behaviour. Action needs to be taken now, to increase communities’ ability to travel 
differently and their willingness to do so10.
4. Consider the role of virtual accessibility. The Vision 2012-22 highlights the importance of action to 
improve Kent’s broadband infrastructure to success in growing our economy. Consider which services 
that could be delivered virtually in the short term until a permanent solution to replace Operation 
Brock is agreed and available? 
5. Learn from best practice. Larger transport authorities, including Transport for London, Transport 
Scotland and Transport for Greater Manchester, have a long history of research into and application 
of technological solutions for traffic management, integrating transport systems, influencing travel 
behaviour and managing overcapacity caused by planned and unplanned disruption. Private sector 
initiatives meanwhile have highlighted ‘mobility as a service’ (MaaS). MaaS service apps could make 
it easier to travel via public and shared transport, with the aim of reducing car ownership and use: it 
may very well play a role in helping our communities to adapt to transport challenges, post-Brexit. 
6 Kenyon, S. 2015. Development and social policy: the role of transport in the UK context. In Hickman, R., Bonilla, D., Givoni, M. And Banister,  
 D. Eds. International Handbook on Transport and Development. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 430-440.
7 Dover District Council Brexit Impact Report. 
8 https://kentandmedway.nhs.uk/latest-news/commissioners-agree-next-steps-east-kent-hospital-services/.
9 Jones, P., Dix, M., Clarke, M. and Heggie, I. 1983. Understanding travel behaviour. Aldershot: Gower Publishing Co. Ltd.
10 https://www.transportforqualityoflife.com/u/files/LSTF-What-Works-Report.pdf.
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POLICE AND SECURITY 
This section focuses on the policing and security considerations and potential impact of Brexit in relation to 
Kent and the South-East, and examines three key areas: 
1. short-term impact on Kent immediately after a ‘no-deal’ Brexit (e.g. transport and potential public 
order related problems); 
2. short and medium-term impacts to European and international policing, of particular relevance to the 
UK government’s negotiation of the future UK–EU security relationship, including criminal justice and 
policing co-operation;
3. short and medium-term impact of Brexit on formal and informal police and judicial coordination 
(including original data by serving police officers). 
 
Data for this section draws upon evidence from the Home Affairs Select Committee, media interviews 
and commentary, think tank reports11 and independent research conducted by the Canterbury Centre for 
Policing Research (CCPR) in association with King’s College London, Ghent University, Belgium and the 
Centre de recherches Sociologiques sur le Droit et les Institutions Pénales (CESDIP, CNRS-Université de 
Versailles), in France.
1. Short-Term Kent Policing Issues 
Civil Unrest Preparations 
The immediate impact of the government reaching ‘no deal’ with the EU has raised concerns relating to a 
leaked report from the National Police Coordination Centre (NPoCC), which details planning for food and 
medicine shortages, transport gridlock and civil disobedience.12 The implementation of such plans have 
profound implications for Kent Police, and police services around Britain itself. Currently, police chiefs are 
preparing plans in the event of a ‘no-deal’ Brexit causing potential civil unrest. While the National Police 
Chiefs’ Council (NPCC) have made it clear that there is no intelligence to suggest that disorder will break 
out in the case of a ‘no-deal’ Brexit, they are nevertheless preparing for any eventuality13. According to 
several media sources, in the event of widespread disorder, the military could be called in to assist police14. 
Contingency plans include consideration of shortages of food, goods and medicine and the possibility that 
this will lead to protest and disorder.
 
Case Study: The 2011 London Riots and the 2012 London Olympics 
Large scale incidents or events require large resources, careful planning and communication with local 
communities. Contingency plans for a ‘no-deal’ Brexit currently include mobilising 7,000 police officers, a 
result of lessons learnt during the 2011 London riots. On the final day of the London riots, 6,000 officers 
were deployed to London with the Metropolitan Police needing additional officers from Thames Valley, 
Essex, Kent, City of London, Norfolk, North Yorkshire, Hertfordshire, Bedfordshire, Surrey and Sussex to 
help quell the disorder. The riots resulted in 2,987 people being arrested and £100m worth of damage 
recorded15. A report into the police response to the 2011 London riots concluded that too few officers 
were sent to deal with the unrest, and that police did not respond fast enough on the first night of the 
riots. The current concern is twofold: the size of government cuts to the police service since 2011; and the 
nature of civil unrest preparations in anticipation of a ‘no-deal’ Brexit. During the 2012 London Olympic 
Games 13,000 officers were required, at a cost of £553million16, supported by a further 17,000 people 
working in conjunction with the armed forces. 
11 https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/IfG_Brexit_policing_criminal_justice_web.pdf 
12 https://www.politicshome.com/news/uk/home-affairs/policing/news/98075/police-chiefs-preparing-%E2%80%98widespread-civil-disorder- 
 under-no 
13 https://news.npcc.police.uk/releases/police-chiefs-to-establish-a-safety-net-if-access-to-eu-security-tools-is-lost
14 https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/sep/18/police-chiefs-no-deal-brexit-would-mean-loss-crime-fighting-tools
15 https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/sep/18/police-chiefs-no-deal-brexit-would-mean-loss-crime-fighting-tools
16 https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/97984/london-2012-public-booklet.pdf
13
Case Study: Operation Stack 
Operation Stack is a form of traffic control last implemented in 2015 as a result of strikes in Calais which 
lead to lorries being parked on the M20 for 31 days. It placed significant pressure on both Highways 
England and Kent Police, diverting resources away from their daily activities across Kent and Medway17, 
with Kent residents ultimately paying for the disruption. Operation Stack demonstrates that post-Brexit, 
Kent will indeed become a frontline county, as a result of being impacted physically in the short and 
medium term more than other counties. At present, despite the increasing likelihood of stoppages and 
delays radiating into and beyond Kent from the Port of Dover, Kent Police have stated that the operational 
order for Operation Stack has at this point been neither changed nor amended in the context of Brexit18. 
Communities and Communication 
Contingency planning is particularly challenging for Brexit, with the National Audit Office pointing 
out significant problems in preparation in relation to staffing the border, information technology and 
widespread uncertainty19. The nature of the problems that may arise as a result of a ‘no deal’ Brexit are  
difficult to predict. This makes it particularly problematic to communicate with citizens in preparing for 
what may, or may not occur, arising from the still unclear outcome of Brexit (as of November 2018). 
 
Kent Impacts 
From the perspective of Kent, particular attention is focused on the Port of Dover as a locale generating 
potentially extreme impacts in terms of civil disorder, with consequential pressure locally, regionally and 
nationally. The envisaged problems include serious blockages at the Port of Dover, the Channel Tunnel 
Terminal (Folkestone) and major roads in Kent. The leaked NPoCC report on police response in the case of 
a no-deal Brexit obtained by The Sunday Times again suggests the possibility of resorting to the military to 
respond to ‘unprecedented and overwhelming’ disruption on the road networks20. 
There is also concern that stagnant or slow moving traffic at the Port of Dover and surrounding road 
networks will lead to disruptions for local communities, possibly creating an ‘antagonistic’ atmosphere 
in the area. Richard Christian, Head of Policy at the Port of Dover observed that in the case of a hard or 
no-deal Brexit there could be “regular gridlock” in Kent, with Operation Stack (i.e. the use of the M20 
motorway to park lorries awaiting transfer through Dover or Folkestone) implemented “around once a 
week”21. 
From the perspective of policing, long queues and gridlocked road systems present potential security 
issues, with commuters of all types swiftly becoming agitated with the situation. Drivers (commercial and 
civil) alike will need access to food and water, restroom facilities etc., and it is unclear as yet to whom these 
requirements and their costs fall. Further, in terms of the disruption to key ‘just-in-time’ items including 
fresh produce and medical supplies, there is concern that a no-deal Brexit could produce shortages of key 
goods, foods and medicine, with the added potential to “feed civil disorder”, whilst rises in prices of goods 
could lead to “widespread protest”22.
17 https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-33669561
18 https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/486096/response/1189281/attach/3/18%2006%20835%20Response%20Letter.pdf?cookie_  
 passthrough=1
19 https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/The-UK-border-preparedness-for-EU-exit.pdf
20 https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/no-deal-brexit-military-police-leaked-document-a8529401.html
21 https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/jun/20/port-of-dover-warning-regular-gridlock-congestion-hard-brexit-trade
22 https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/brexit-no-deal-ports-met-police-cressida-dick-dover-immigration-imports-  
 latest-a8532721.html
14
Kent Police Contingency Planning 
The key issue is that of police preparedness, and their short and medium-term ability to effectively respond 
to potential unrest. In the event of a ‘no deal’ Brexit, Kent Police and other agencies will have competing 
roles to fulfil. Critically, Kent Police will need to: 
• manage the impact of congested ports with public order issues between drivers and staff, and the 
safe management of hazardous goods (both Dover and Folkestone);
• commit resources to manage the Kent road network (either via a renewed Operation Stack or the 
proposed Operation Brock);
• tackle additional demands relating to mutual aid (police services supporting each other through 
shared resources) during a period of potential unprecedented demand.
 
2. Short and Medium-term impacts to European and 
International Policing
Context 
Within the EU, increasing political integration, especially the removal of intra- European borders brought 
about by the Schengen Accord and the guarantee of the Treaty on European Union’s four freedoms 
brought about the establishment of a European police office, Europol in 1992. Police and judicial 
cooperation across the 28 EU Member States is played out in a changing social, political and economic 
context in which key cross-border challenges have to be identified and managed. Equally, with the 
increasing pluralisation of policing, police reform, varying legislative requirements, public accountability, 
and frequently dwindling budgets. The importance of information, data-sharing agreements and a shared 
history of collaboration has produced dramatic changes in the quality of data collected, and the ability of 
Europol and MS police services to subsequently monitor threats. Brexit, however, may prove the greatest 
contemporary challenge of all. This section examines the range of tools embodied in EU legislation, 
regulations, agreements and informal working mechanisms allowing policing agencies between Member 
States to work together. 
European Arrest Warrant
Prior to the EAW, only 60 people were extradited per year by the UK23. Between 2004 to 2015, the UK 
extradited over 8,000 individuals to other Member States24. Since April 2009, 12,000 individuals have been 
arrested across the EU using the EAW, with 1,735 individuals arrested in the UK under the EAW between 
2016-2017. Other key tools include Joint Investigative Teams (JIT) and the European Investigation Order 
(EIO), and Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA). A further proposal in 2013 suggested the establishment of 
European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) which would seek to prosecute crimes committed against the 
EU’s financial interests.25 
European Criminal Records Inforamtion System (ECRIS) 
ECRIS is a secure electronic system that enables exchanging information on criminal convictions between 
the authorities of the Member States.26 It is important to note that while maintaining access to ECRIS and 
SIS II are a top priority for the UK, there is “no precedent for the EU permitting access to its tools by non-
EU (ECRIS) or non-Schengen (SIS II) members”.27
23 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2018/604975/IPOL_STU(2018)604975_EN.pdf
24 https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201719/ldselect/ldeucom/164/164.pdf
25 The UK Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) is a heavy user of Eurojust, while the UK itself is one of the largest users of the JITs, currently   
 participating in 31 (House of Lords, 2016, p. 22).
26 https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/cross-border-cases/judicial-cooperation/tools-judicial-cooperation/european-criminal-records-information-system- 
 ecris_en
27 House of Lords, 2016, p. 2
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The Second Generation Schengen Information (SIS II)
Large cross-border data systems are crucial to the identification and reduction of crime. As Deputy 
Assistant Commissioner Richard Martin, the National Police Chiefs’ Council (NPCC) Lead for Brexit observed, 
“criminals don’t respect borders – 70% of transient organized crime groups operate in more than three 
countries28”. SIS II is an exceptionally helpful tool in this respect, having produced 765 million alerts by the 
end of 2017. Martin outlined the risks of Britain’s removal from the SIS II system: 
“[we] will no longer be able to share real-time alerts for wanted persons, including serious 
criminals; respond less swiftly to alerts for missing people on either side of the Channel delaying 
reuniting them with their loved ones; our collective ability to map terrorist and criminal networks 
across Europe and bring those responsible to justice would be reduced. We remain hopeful that 
a deal that allows us maintain these capabilities can be struck29.”
 
Should Britain be unable to make use of SIS II post-Brexit, new arrangements will need to be swiftly 
negotiated. However, it is clear that in doing so, the current capability of British police to work effectively 
with EU counterparts in cross border investigations will be materially hindered. 
Eurojust 
Eurojust is an EU agency which works to support and strengthen “coordination and cooperation between 
national investigating and prosecuting authorities in relation to serious crime affecting two or more 
MS”.30 Its key tools are MLA (Mutual Legal Assistance), EAW (European Arrest Warrant), and JITs (Joint 
Investigation Teams). 
Europol
The UK has contributed strongly to the development of Europol. Specific developments over the past 
nine years are in part credited to Rob Wainwright, Europol Director between April 2009 until May 2018 
when he was succeeded by Catherine De Bolle. Commenting on Wainwright’s leadership in transforming 
Europol, David Armond, former Deputy Director General of the National Crime Agency (NCA) observed 
that Europol was “unrecognisable from the one that went before”, and that “most of the systems that 
make Europol effective are a complete lift and shift from the UK intelligence model31.” Speaking in January 
2018, Wainwright himself described the development of Europol in recent years: 
 
“You can see the British DNA of policing in the way this institution works and many other parts 
of cross-border police co-operation…. Every day there is a police operation here, affecting Britain 
in a positive way, that Europol is helping with and the essence of that I think will continue - but 
of course it depends on getting the right deal32.” 
 
Matthew Burton (Head of the NCA’s International Crime Bureau), observed that significant contribution 
from the UK have led to operational advantages in intelligence sharing at both Europol and SIS II: 
 
“…in 2016 the UK was the highest contributor to Europol serious and organised crime 
analysis projects, and the highest contributor of information in relation to firearms, child sexual 
exploitation and abuse, money laundering, cyber, and modern slavery33.”
 
It is precisely these relationships and networks that are crucial to combating international and organised 
crime both in the UK, and between British and European partners. Brexit-induced changes to access to 
information across Europe however raises serious questions about the effectiveness of current policing 
activities.
28  https://news.npcc.police.uk/releases/police-chiefs-to-establish-a-safety-net-if-access-to-eu-security-tools-is-lost
29  https://news.npcc.police.uk/releases/police-chiefs-to-establish-a-safety-net-if-access-to-eu-security-tools-is-lost
30  House of Lords, 2016, p. 21
31  https://news.npcc.police.uk/releases/chief-constable-dave-thompson-policing-is-at-the-tipping-point-and-weve-got-to-move-on-from-here
32  https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-42874985
33  https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmhaff/635/63506.html
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Brexit and the Risk of Reduced Access
The reduction in British involvement with Europol, from the leadership of Rob Wainwright as the former 
Director, to the extensive expertise built up among seconded police and liaison officers across Europe 
means fundamental changes in terms of British influence in Europe, and use of European networks and 
expertise. Simply put, reduced access to key EU policing and judicial tools reduces Britain’s own ability 
to assess, map and respond effectively to terrorist and criminal networks. Partial or no access to large 
databases like SIS will preclude all the current modes intelligence and real-time alerts on individuals and 
groups presenting a possible threat to the UK34. 
Losing access to European Arrest Warrant (EAW), will likewise have damaging consequences, including 
extradition delays from the average 6-day time period to 66 days, on the basis of the the 1957 
convention35. Arguably, as observed by Steve Rodhouse Director General of ‘Operations’, NCA, “European 
law enforcement is more effective when we take coordinated action on shared priorities. A lack of access 
to these European tools would mean a reduction in the ability of the UK to contribute to keeping Europe 
safe”. 
 
Brexit Preparedness
A no-deal Brexit would see Britain revert to a ‘third country’ status, diminishing its participation in EU-wide 
collaborative networks and data-sharing options. These would be replaced by:
• the 1957 European Convention on Extradition;
• mutual legal assistance in lieu of the European Investigation Order (EIO); 
• relying on Interpol and bilateral arrangements with other Member States 
Whilst these measures will over time become workable, they will arguably also be much slower, resource-
intensive, and ultimately ‘sub-optimal’ to Britain’s current arrangements as an EU Member State. 
In addition, the NPCC, on the basis of £2 million Home Office funding, has set up a new unit to look into 
alternatives for police services should partial or all access to current European systems be lost. With the 
support of Chief Constables, and the National Crime Agency (NCA), the NPCC has approved police services 
contingency plans. Again, despite these preparations, it is expected that the UK will initially have to revert 
to slower, more bureaucratic processes, making ‘it much harder to protect UK citizens and much harder to 
protect EU citizens’36, as suggested by National Police Chiefs’ Council Chair, Sara Thornton.
 
34  https://news.npcc.police.uk/releases/police-chiefs-to-establish-a-safety-net-if-access-to-eu-security-tools-is-lost
35  https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-45561527
36  https://news.npcc.police.uk/releases/police-chiefs-to-establish-a-safety-net-if-access-to-eu-security-tools-is-lost
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Key UK-EU Security Tools and Agencies
TOOL WHAT IS IT? WHY IS IT IMPORTANT? ACCESS OPTION  POST-BREXIT
European 
Arrest 
Warrant 
(EAW)
A legal framework that 
allows bringing criminals to 
justice across borders
Without the framework 
extradition would fall under 
the outdated 1957 Council 
of Europe Convention 
on Extradition Article 6 
which provides that states 
can refuse an extradition 
request for one of their own 
nationals
EAW does not have 
provision for third 
countries. The UK’s 
option is to negotiate 
a similar but separate 
agreement with the 
EU (e.g. Norway & 
Iceland)
European 
Criminal 
Records 
Information 
System 
(ECRIS)
A secure electronic system 
that enables exchanging 
information on criminal 
convictions between the 
authorities of the Member 
States
The UK was the second most 
active Member State in 2016 
to use ECRIS to exchange 
information with other 
Member States
There is no precedent 
for the EU permitting 
access to ECRIS by 
non-EU states
Second 
Generation 
Schengen 
Information 
System 
(SIS II)
A system that allows
issuing alerts and consulting 
between Member States 
on persons regarding their 
involvement in serious crimes 
or rights to enter to the EU 
countries
SIS II is very well embedded 
in the UK police force and 
is used every day. Statistics 
tell that while the UK only 
received 0.22% of the total 
alerts issued in 2016, the 
UK had the second most 
(12.9%) access to it
There is no precedent 
for the EU permitting 
access to SIS II by 
non-Schengen states
Eurojust
An EU agency which 
supports and strengthens the 
Member States’ investigating 
and prosecuting authorities 
ability to fight serious crimes 
that concern two or more 
Member States
The Crown Prosecution 
Service (CPS) is a frequent 
user of Eurojust and the UK 
is one of the largest users of 
Eurojust’s key tool of Joint 
Investigative Teams (JITs), 
having participated in 31 in 
2016
There is a precedent 
for concluding 
a cooperation 
agreement that 
allows data 
exchange, and the 
nomination of a 
Liaison Prosecutor 
for Eurojust, such as 
the ones nominated 
by Switzerland and 
the US
Europol
An EU agency that supports 
law enforcement authorities 
in the Member States and 
facilitates cooperation 
between these authorities 
where the crimes affect two 
or more Member States
The UK is a significant 
contributor to European 
efforts to tackle serious and 
organised crime, and around 
40% of Europol casework 
has a British focus
Europol has 
Operational 
Agreements with 
14 non-EU states 
so there is a 
precedent for the 
UK to negotiate 
an Operational 
Agreement which 
would allow 
the exchange 
of information, 
including personal 
data
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3. Short and medium-term impact of Brexit on formal and informal 
police and judicial coordination 
Informal Police Cooperation: the general exchange of information between police forces at the sub-
judicial or pre-judicial level as well the many issue-specific police cooperation networks (e.g. sharing of 
information on new criminal techniques between police in two different EU Member States).
 
Judicial Cooperation: the exchange of evidence required for the investigation and prosecution of 
crime In different jurisdictions. This can be the formal request for evidence (e.g. a bank, previous 
criminal records of suspects, DNA samples), presently conducted by means of an international letter of 
request (ILoR) or European Investigation Order (EIO) within the EU, much of which is undertaken by 
the police.
Formal Police Cooperation: combined informal police cooperation and formal judicial cooperation. 
In some EU Member States (e.g. The Republic of Ireland, the UK), the police are responsible for 
conducting criminal investigations, whilst in others (e.g. France and Spain) the respective ministries 
of justice conduct investigations using police detectives. In other cases, police are asked to conduct 
preliminary investigations followed up by FLoR for formal evidence. 
Policing agencies in the UK and Europe have historically relied upon ‘informal’ arrangements to help make 
police cooperation work. As legislation and new forms of information sharing has developed ‘formal’ 
arrangements have improved cooperation alongside ‘informal’ engagement between agencies. Europe 
has a wide variety of different structures of policing and border agencies developing from different social, 
economic and political histories with centralised command structures. Police services continue to evolve 
and sometimes embark on significant reform as can be seen by the nationalisation of Police Scotland, and 
the restructuring of the Police Service of the Netherlands. Despite structural changes to police services, 
informal and formal cooperation manages to bridge the differences in different police organisations across 
Europe. 
In Britain, many policing arrangements remain locally delivered and accountable, with high levels of 
discretion at an operational level. Such informal arrangements are based on trust and discretion. We know 
discretion in policing is based on some premise of a legislative context, reason and justification. In the 
context of cross border cooperation and informal interactions between agencies we can see systematic 
discretion in operation but based on formal agreements on information sharing. Importantly, this informal 
discretionary arrangement has been allowed to operate and facilitate meaningful cooperation between 
regions, urban and rural areas, and Member States themselves. We also know that informal policing 
relationships assist in successfully ‘filling in the gaps’ between more structured police and judicial relations 
within the EU. 
The question of course is how far informal relationships can realistically stretch within the contours of 
Brexit, and – as per above - to what extent current formal arrangements will remain. 
Policing Resources in the UK
Policing in the United Kingdom has suffered significant cut backs with over 21,300 fewer officers and a 
reduction to the overall police workforce of 44,745 employees representing a 18.3% cut on 2010 levels 
of staffing3738. The police have experienced overall budget cuts of 19% in real terms since 201039 but 
the central government contribution to funding has reduced by 30%40. As cuts are made to other public 
services, inevitably demand increases further on policing as the service of last resort. In 2011, the London 
riots required the London Metropolitan Police to make the unprecedented call for emergency assistance 
from other police services. 
37 https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/115745/hosb1410.pdf
38 https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/726401/hosb1118-police-workforce.pdf
39 https://news.npcc.police.uk/releases/chief-constable-dave-thompson-policing-is-at-the-tipping-point-and-weve-got-to-move-on-from-here
40 https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Financial-sustainability-of-police-forces-in-England-and-Wales-2018.pdf
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National Police Chiefs’ Council (NPCC) Chair, Sara Thornton, speaking in March 2018 in response to Her 
Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services (HMICFRS) when asked to assess police 
effectiveness, said:
“In the last year policing has been under real strain with rising crime and demand that is more 
complex, an unprecedented terror threat, and officer numbers at 1985 levels. We talked last 
September about how the response to terror attacks had led to backlogs of incidents and a 
slower response to the public – and we see in this report that a major force rated as highly 
efficient is failing to give a timely enough response to vulnerable victims as a result41”
Currently, all police services review their roles, and contemplate the future in the context of further cuts. 
Metropolitan Police Commissioner, Cressida Dick describes the contemporary choices open to police 
leaders: 
“You make choices either about reducing the scope of the mission or taking more risk about 
what you do. Of course, if I speak for the MPS, we have made £7 million worth of efficiencies 
in the last few years and we are in the middle of the largest change programme the MPS has 
ever been through, definitely. We have another couple of hundred million to find. I am sure 
everybody would say there is probably a little bit more efficiency they could squeeze here and 
there, but what we see is this huge rising expectation and demand that is putting a massive 
strain on our people, and it cannot go on without hard choices: either, as I say, more money, 
smaller mission, greater risk appetite42”.
The current situation, according to Chief Constable Dave Thompson, depicts British policing as at a tipping 
point: 
“Core aspects of policing - such as answering calls, attending emergencies, investigating 
crime, bringing offenders to justice and neighbourhood policing - are being pushed beyond 
sustainability, and are in danger of becoming ineffective to the detriment of confidence in the 
police43”
Brexit Responsiveness 
The general perception is of UK police therefore is as overstretched and inadequately resourced. The 
immediate focus of this report however is police responsiveness to the multiplicity of direct and indirect 
challenges arising from the UK’s departure from the EU on 29 March, 2019, including logistical congestion 
to physical networks, and potential public order incidents. 
Police leaders argue that current pressures, combined with ongoing austerity measures, have left forces 
in general less able to protect communities and meet rising demands. The ability of the police to share 
resources through mutual aid in response to additional demands from Brexit must be called into question 
when so many police services across the country are feeling the impact of huge budget reductions.
This will leave the police with the difficult decision as to what they prioritize and which areas suffer 
as a result of being ranked a low priority. This places police services, particularly those in proximity to 
infrastructure and social pinch points as in Kent, in a vulnerable position in terms of their ability to respond 
to new and unfamiliar demands. 
We can however hypothesize that the impact of Brexit will fall more heavily on frontline areas like Kent 
where the sheer range, and concentration of tasks, combined with deep ambiguity as to the shape of the 
outcome, will make the roles and responsibilities of those police organizations that much more critical. 
In the context of a no-deal Brexit, such pressing resource demands will fall disproportionally heavily on 
strategically-designated police services including those in Kent and Medway, where – as noted – the impact 
of Brexit is likely to be felt physically, materially, economically, and socially. 
41 https://news.npcc.police.uk/releases/inspectorate-finds-policing-in-england-and-wales-is-effective-but-under-strain-1
42 http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/home-affairs-committee/policing-for-the-future/  
 oral/84322.pdf
43 https://news.npcc.police.uk/releases/chief-constable-dave-thompson-policing-is-at-the-tipping-point-and-weve-got-to-move-on-from-here
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Views on the Cross Border Policing and Implications of Brexit: Current Perspectives 
from Law Enforcement Professionals 
The following section contains wholly original research conducted in collaboration with Canterbury 
Christ Church University (CCCU), King’s College London, Ghent University, Belgium and the Centre de 
recherches Sociologiques sur le Droit et les Institutions Pénales (CESDIP, CNRS-Université de Versailles), in 
France. Research here took various forms, including a central questionnaire aimed at policing professionals 
working in and between Britain and Europe. What follows highlights the central views of those police 
officers within the sample, presenting both quantitative and qualitative responses. 
It should be noted that the views collected represent personal insights of the participants rather than 
as representative of the various organisations in which they are employed. Equally, respondents were 
approached for their specific perspectives as experts with relevant roles, selected in accordance with the 
working criteria across a border policing cohort between Britain and Europe. While the initial findings 
represent a small sample (n=57), each of the respondents are highly informed professionals on matters 
relating to cross border policing activities both between Britain and France, and by implication the 
importance of international policing arrangements across the European Union.44 
As outlined above, key EU developments have seen several legislative measures adopted, and key agencies 
established, including the European Arrest Warrant (EAW), Joint Investigative Teams (JIT), Eurojust, the 
Schengen Information System (SIS II) and the European Investigation Order (EIO), which together have 
largely replaced police and judicial tools from the original Council of Europe treaties. The research team 
was keen to discover:
• police cooperation on the basis of current EU measures;
• the impact of a no-deal Brexit (with Britain withdrawing from all European policing bodies, tools 
and databases), including Council of Europe replacements to investigate and prosecute cross-border 
criminality.
These perceptions are crucial to understanding the importance of existing arrangements and the 
challenges of the future.
British-European Police Cooperation
Differences between national agencies requires, as has already been referred to in this report, a mixture 
of legislation, agreements and informal working. Indeed, there have been questions raised in terms of the 
British model of policing and fitness for purpose, although past attempts in structure reform have failed45. 
However, a range of complex arrangements have evolved over time within the EU to facilitate cross border 
working between practitioners, providing a bridge for an otherwise disjointed and fragmented system in 
which to cooperate. 
Given the complexities of cross border policing and the different interests at play between Member States, 
the views of respondents are strongly positive. 84% of participants believe police cooperation was either 
‘good’ or ‘very good’, with the majority judging cooperation to be ‘good’. A small minority was more 
neutral in their response, a smaller group believing that cooperation was poor. These responses also reflect 
varying degrees of success and confidence in terms of police cooperation. Others highlighted areas for 
improvement including simplification, better knowledge and more sharing. The differences in judicial 
systems is referred to by a French respondent; structural differences between inquisitorial and adversarial 
justice systems inevitably constitutes a challenge to cooperation. 
44 The research was conducted between January and May 2018. Fifty-seven responses were received identifying themselves as police   
 professionals from 17 different countries. Overall the responses were from the United Kingdom (20), France (7), Belgium (6), Netherlands   
 (5), Spain (3), Ireland (3), Portugal (2) and Poland (2). One response was received from each of the following countries: Bulgaria, Croatia,   
 Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Greece, Norway, Romania and Slovakia.
45 http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/home-affairs-committee/policing-for-the-future/  
 oral/84322.pdf HMIC - https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmicfrs/media/closing-the-gap-20050911.pdf
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Question 1: What is your view of the present state of policy cooperation between 
the UK and X agencies within the EU states? 
The Impact of EU Measures
While police cooperation may be broadly positive 
the effectiveness and impact of EU measures 
reflects further operational value. As outlined 
above, EU measures aimed at supporting crime 
fighting have evolved over the years and continue 
to be adapted to the needs of police services 
across Europe. While the views of professionals 
in the field remain positive, a smaller proportion 
believe EU measure are ‘Very good’ and ‘good’. 
This in part is influenced by an increased number 
of participants opting for the ‘don’t know 
category’. 
Interestingly, although a significant number of 
participants responded neutrally to the question, 
no respondents responded negatively. Perspectives 
in this category refer both to the effectiveness of 
particular EU measures, and also other outcomes 
by virtue of working through using these formal 
measures. The benefits of enhancing networks and learning experiences have for example been referred 
to by some respondents. While the majority of respondents comment on the usefulness, and speedier 
responses enabled by measures particularly EAW, Europol and JIT, a small minority of respondents 
commented on issues regarding trust and s lack of understanding of particular measures. Overall, the 
respondents believed the EU measures have a positive impact on cooperation.
A selection of the qualitative responses from public police organization representatives: 
“The UK has the largest footprint of staff at Europol & many overseas liaison officers working on a 
bilateral basis in European countries which enables effective intelligence sharing” (British respondent).
“The level of cooperation is hindered by the UK opt outs but satisfactory to some degree” (Croatian 
respondent).
 “I’ve a good relation [sic] with the UK Liaison Officers and this relationship supports the International 
Cooperation” (Dutch respondent).
“There is a reasonable [sic] good level of information exchange, good cooperation through Europol 
and bilateral too” (Romanian respondent).
“From a [UK] Police perspective I think it’s good -we have a long history of informal …. liaison … and 
have increased European contact through the Foreign Law Enforcement Community FLEC network 
and working with Interpol. There remains a lack of knowledge in terms of what can and can’t be 
done, there remains an element of ‘empire building’ in some organisations that can hamper co-
operation there are probably too many players, layers and databases for police co-operation to be 
wholly effective” (British respondent).
“The UK is one of the most active contributors at EUROPOL in relation to criminal intelligence and 
often initiate opportunities for EU to join effort if combatting serious and organised crime. However, 
their particular judicial system often limited the possibilities for Police sector to enforce criminal law 
against large and complex criminal network. Their contribution are [sic] therefore constrained in the 
intelligence field with limited action at operational level” (French Respondent). 
Very good 
19% 
Good 
65% 
Neither good  
or bad 
7% 
Bad  
4% 
Very Bad 
0% 
Don’t Know  
5% 
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Question 2: What has the impact of EU measures (e.g. EAW, Europol, JIT) been on 
policing cooperation with the UK?
Informal and Formal Police 
Cooperation
The survey uncovered the views of officers in 
relation to formal and informal relationships 
in international policing in relation to the UK 
and Europe. Previous research46 has identified 
the existence and importance of these working 
arrangements. Acknowledgement of formal 
and informal relationships are interrelated and 
that the introduction of new arrangements 
will need to take account of the connection 
between the formal and informal relationships 
in providing sustainable international police 
cooperation work. 
The objective of pursing and prosecuting 
criminals can therefore be hindered or enabled 
by effective agreements that impact on 
perceptions of formal relationships. A high 
proportion of respondents believed formal 
relations with either ‘very good’ or ‘good’. 
Although, a positive response to EU measures this question was among the other questions relating to 
police cooperation scored less positively in the highest category. The challenges around legislation, powers 
and agreements create demands of police with particular levels of knowledge to operate effectively and 
can according to some respondents create delays and bureaucracy, although this was only noted by a 
small number of respondents. 
A selection of the qualitative responses from public police organization representatives: 
“All measures that increased a lot the Justice and Police cooperation not only with the UK but 
also with the 27 other member states” (Belgian respondent).
“EAW and JIT framework are both very important tools for an efficient judicial response to crime. 
As a Norwegian participant struggling to come around the shortness of EAW (and just recently 
joined the JIT framework) this is obvious” (Norwegian respondent).
“The UK makes extensive use of EAWs both to arrest fugitives from the UK and those of our 
EU partners in the UK. The EAW is a powerful tool, which enables us to ensure the speedy 
repatriation of our fugitives, but also ensures the speedy removal of foreign fugitives from the 
UK. JITs are utilized by the NCA and larger metropolitan forces but not to the same extent as 
EAWs. EUROPOL and CEPOL are used extensively by all of UK law enforcement. The UK Team at 
EUROPOL consists of NCA, MPS, HMRC and Border Force Officers” (British respondent).
“…police cooperation through JIT or EUROPOL’s activities has been excellent and not only in 
exchanging operational intelligence but also in providing relevant accurate and up to date 
strategic intelligence” (French respondent). 
46 Gallagher, F (2003) ‘Cross-border Police Cooperation: The Kent Experience’ in J. Anderson, L O’Dowd & T.M Wilson (eds) New Bordrs for a  
 Changing Europe, London: Frank Cass Publications, pp. 111-134.
Very good 
23% 
Good 
40% 
Neither good or bad 
21% 
Bad  
0% 
Very 
Bad 
0% 
Don’t Know  
16% 
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Question 3: How would you describe the ‘formal’ policing relationships between 
the UK and European partners in relation to prosecution? 
A selection of the qualitative responses 
from public police organization 
representatives provide further context to 
view on formal relationships:
“UK participation in the strategic 
work at Europol will be affected 
after the Brexit. This will result 
in less impact on European 
priorities, which are also of 
relevance for Third Parties in 
Europe. This is very visible for 
a country as Norway who 
has a TP role both at Europol 
and Eurojust” (Norwegian 
respondent).
“There are well established 
formal protocols for requesting 
and exchanging evidential 
material for use in prosecutions. 
These have assisted UK law enforcement in bringing numerous prosecutions to court” 
(British respondent).
“…the processes are now clear and if followed provide a valuable service, I think more can still 
be done to educate officers in what is available but this improves on an almost weekly basis 
as the Police and LEA’s have more cause to liaise with European partners, I also refer to our 
relationship with non-euro partners, this relies heavily on established contacts and networks and 
the pathways are less clear” (British respondent).
“In contrast to the past, the relationship between Belgium and the UK within the framework of 
police cooperation and information exchange has become much better” (Belgian respondent). 
 “Via Europol, the different Liaison Desks had direct contacts and could discuss directly cases or 
operational strategies” (Belgian respondent).
Very good 
16% 
Good 
51% 
Neither good or bad 
5% 
Bad  
3% 
Very Bad 
2% 
Don’t Know  
23% 
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Question 4: How would you describe the ‘informal’ policing relationships between 
the UK and European partners in relation to prosecution? 
Informal relationships can be linked to formal arrangements in that they can be the source of establishing 
relationships where more informal communication is pursued and built up after working in a formal 
context. This was the most positive response from participants in the survey with 33.5% rating informal 
relationships as ‘very good’, with few respondents with neutral or negative views, and a minority selecting 
the ‘don’t know option’. While others suggest room for improvement (a majority of participants did not 
elect the ‘very good’ category), in the overall context of the complexities of implementing cross-national 
agreements, this can be seen as evidence of reasonable success. 
Brexit Impacts to formal and 
informal policing
The short-term impact could be significant, 
with no deal or transition in place there will 
be no formal framework to conclude any 
informal police cooperation. In addition, 
the lack of a formal framework would 
place limitations on the impact of informal 
relationships. For example, without the 
ability to exchange evidence, and relying 
solely on 1957 Council of Europe Convention 
on Extradition would ultimately prove more 
bureaucratic than current arrangements. 
In addition, the impact of an inevitable 
reduction in the number of EU liaison officers 
based in the UK, or British officers within 
Europol may have a direct impact on the 
viability of formal and informal cooperation. 
The following free text responses provide further detail regarding attitudes to formal and informal policing
 “..depends of course on the countries and persons. Informal networks existed, exists and will 
always exist. ‘Old boys’ networks” (Belgian respondent). 
 “There are extremely effective informal channels of communication between the UK and 
European law enforcement partners where criminal intelligence is often exchanged ahead of 
formal requests for evidential material. This is facilitated by the extensive liaison officer network 
the UK has in Europe and the EU liaison Officers based in the UK. Officers also utilize contacts 
made on CEPOL and EUROPOL courses and conferences”(British respondent). 
“One criticism is that the UK regularly asks its partners for assistance (e.g. surveillance 
and controlled deliveries), but frequently doesn’t have the capacity to reciprocate these 
services”(British respondent).
 “We have a good network of informal, European policing partners built up over a number of 
years on mutual trust and confidence” (British respondent).
“With impact of increased demand and reduced capacity across most Policing spheres of 
expertise informal requests are not a priority and will be dealt with as and when capacity allows. 
This can result in missed requests” (British respondent).
 “Through the good cooperation and participation in international conferences you build a 
strong network that is a big advantage”(Belgian respondent).
Very good 
33% 
Good 
37% 
Neither good or bad 
10% 
Bad  
2% 
Very Bad 
0% 
Don’t Know  
18% 
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The Impact of Brexit on Policing
This aspect of the research turned to perceptions regarding the potential impact of Brexit, in terms of both 
current relationships, short-term alternative measures, and longer-term requirements. Three questions 
were asked of respondents in this respect: A selection of the qualitative responses from public police 
organization representatives provide further context to view on informal relationships.
Question 5: If the UK was unable to participate in EU arrangements47, what do you 
think would be the impact on policing cooperation in the EU? 
Of the three questions asked regarding the impact of Brexit, being unable to participate in particular EU 
arrangements provided the strongest response. Situated within a ‘no deal’ or hard-Brexit scenario, 
assuming an absence of British usage of current EU measures, 93% of respondents (both British and 
European) expected some overall impact on current policing structures, and 78.8% expected a very strong, 
or strong impact. Only 5% considered that there would be no impact at all. Indeed, the consensus points 
clearly to the potential impact on both sides, both the UK and the EU, including the consequences of 
ultimately undermining current, positive working relationships, reducing the overall ability of UK police to 
protect UK and European citizens post-Brexit. While informal relationships may operate, other views 
highlight serious concerns about delays, and the day-to-day impact of a ‘no deal’ Brexit.
The following free text responses 
provide more detail regarding no-
deal consequences for UK-EU policing 
cooperation: 
“Without European Investigation 
Orders/Arrest Warrants, we 
could not secure the arrest of UK 
suspects in Europe or evidential 
material” (British respondent).
“The UK would have to fall back 
on UN declarations and accords 
and although cooperation would 
continue it would be slower 
and more bureaucratic” (British 
respondent)
 “EAWs and JITs are useful 
law enforcement tools and a 
potential lack of access to them 
could hamper international cooperation” (British respondent).
“The mutual legal assistance will be always available but may be affected by a strong delay” 
(Slovak respondent).
“Any disruption in the process for serving European Investigation Orders would have an impact 
on UK investigations that have an overseas dimension” (British Respondent).
“Lacking the EU instruments for cooperation would impact negatively and only bilateral 
cooperation, if established, would bring improvement but not at the level of effectiveness 
existent before” (Romanian respondent). 
47 EAW, JIT, PRUM, SIS II, Europol, Eurojust, Interpol, EIO, ECRIS, Informal cooperation networks (E.g. CCIC, PWGT, Club of Berne, ColpoFer,   
 EAASP, EJN etc.), and juxtaposed border controls.
Very strong impact 
42% 
strong impact 
37% 
some impact 
14% 
unsure 
0% 
little impact 
0% 
very small impact 
0% 
no impact 
5% Don’t know 
2% 
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Question 6: In your view, will Brexit have any impact on the effectiveness of  
cross-border prosecution and judicial cooperation between the UK and the EU  
as a whole? 
The post Brexit impact of prosecution and judicial cooperation also attracted a clear response with 73.7% 
believing there will be impact and 45.6% believing there will be a very strong or strong impact. Some 
responses expressed concern about not knowing which changes will occur, suggesting a range of 
replacements will be needed to ensure basic cooperation works. As the responses indicate, the overall 
ambiguity of Brexit itself – in terms of which current arrangements will be retained or new measures 
introduced - makes it enormously difficult for practitioners to assess with any certainty any of the multiples 
outcomes. Comments range from throwing European police cooperation back decades to rising delays, 
and distrust, all significantly slowing police cooperation. There is a clear warning from this sample that 
negative outcomes are highly likely if clear UK-EU cross-border police and judicial agreements cannot be 
made.
The following free text responses 
provide more detail regarding 
no-deal consequences for UK-EU 
judicial cooperation: 
“If formal borders, we go back in 
time: 30-40 years ago. Will depend 
on the Brexit final agreements” 
(Belgian respondent). 
“It will make it a lot more complex 
and time consuming. The UK will 
have to rely on newly negotiated 
bilateral agreements and UN 
accords” (British respondent). 
“‘We [would] have no recognized 
measure [with which] to interact 
and exchange evidence” (British 
respondent). 
 “The process will be more 
cumbersome and outgoing requests will cease due to inertia and incoming requests will take 
longer, cost more and be unsatisfactory to the requesting country” (British respondent).
“Issues such as EU arrest warrants, the sharing of data and participation in EU operations will all 
be affected” (Irish respondent). 
“A new framework for cooperation has to be designed” (Romanian respondent).
“We don’t know the impact on current working practices, access to Schengen, EIOs etc. 
We don’t know what will be agreed decided between EU and GB on these issues” (British 
respondent). 
…. it will for sure slow down any process and led to more complex mechanism” 
(French respondent).
Very strong impact 
26% 
strong impact 
19% 
some impact 
28% 
unsure 
0% 
little impact 
7% 
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0% 
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Don’t know 
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Question 7: In your view, will Brexit have any impact on the effectiveness of cross 
border policing cooperation between the UK and the EU? 
The impact of cross border cooperation is difficult to predict. Police services often ‘make things work’ 
when dealing with emergencies. Discretion is often used and in the long history of international policing 
cooperation adaptation and persistence have been key. However, continental models of policing are more 
politicised in terms of the command processes and structures. This raises the question of political influence 
on the future of police cooperation. Here, responses range from acknowledging that cooperation is likely 
to worsen, to a belief that agreements to bridge the differences will simply have to be made. 
The sheer necessity for such arrangements - even if sub-optimal – emerges as a clear response. Others 
suggest the short-term agreements will change as perceptions and circumstances themselves shift, 
including the potentially damaging consequences of a no-deal outcome. Unsurprisingly, a key issue is 
border management, including issues of EU and UK citizenship and new customs arrangements. As of 
November 2018, no new or alternative measures regarding cross border policing have been put in place. 
Police leaders have stated that if current 
arrangements are not maintained then 
future cooperation will be more time 
consuming, and less effective. 
The following accounts from respondents 
provide more detail regarding ‘no-deal’ 
consequences on cross-border policing 
arrangements: 
“At a policing level I believe the 
will to make it work will endure 
but there will be difficulty and 
require good relationships” 
(British respondent).
“The UK will still retain a 
presence at Europol as the US 
and other non EU countries do. 
This should not affect our ability 
to share intelligence” (British 
respondent).
“We will assist a hard negotiation, but in the end UK and EU will achieve a solution in terms of 
prosecution and judicial cooperation” (Portuguese respondent).
(“The UK will be isolated more” (Belgian respondent).
“The Irish/Northern Irish border is a huge unknown, and a worrying issues because organized 
crime groups (OCGs) take advantage of the unpoliced land border to engage in excise fraud. 
UK and FR cooperation is currently good in terms of fighting alcohol fraud, mainly due to 
intelligence sharing and combined controls. Brexit will probably change this for the worse” (British 
respondent).
“Leaving the EU will deprive the UK of access but above all finance from the EU communal 
organisms and thus limit the presence of our colleagues from meetings and operations which are 
however important for the dismantling of European structures” (French respondent).
 “Information sharing will become more difficult. New agreements will need to be drawn up 
which takes time” (British respondent). 
“…much relies on bilateral agreements, and therefore has little effect. The biggest effect in the 
context of Brexit is the change in border control (NO EU citizens anymore) and in the field of 
customs legislation” (Dutch respondent). 
“Other cooperation exchange channel can be used such as INTERPOL however it will narrow 
down the opportunities for UK and EU to exchange” (French respondent).
Very strong impact 
26% 
strong impact 
26% 
some impact 
26% 
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little impact 
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0% 
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9% 
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Policy Suggestions 
The process of negotiating Brexit is the overarching uncertainty in the absence of an agreement, and 
lack of clear contingency planning in terms of preparing for a hard Brexit, or a ‘no deal’. Even if a deal 
can be achieved the content of the deal and the likely impact on policing, ports and international 
police cooperation leaves little time to undertake the necessary preparations. While international police 
cooperation has been successful in recent years, the departure of a leading state within the EU framework 
is unprecedented. Nor are the consequences known in terms of regional, national or local communities. 
While much remains unknown, a few vital plans must be put in place involving national and local 
government, national and local policing, and respective EU and European counterparts: 
• The importance of national and local coordination to understand the cumulative impact across ports 
and public – private services locally and nationwide is crucial for preparation.
• Community awareness and preparation will be crucial to mitigating impact.
• Negotiations must aim to achieve outcomes that match as closely as possible the current 
arrangements.
• The limits of mutual aid and the need for military intervention needs to be carefully monitored while 
keeping public informed of plans.
• National assessment of transport network congestion and identification of strategic hotspots for 
congestion, public order and resource needs.
• Identify additional crime threats.
• Access the cost of ‘no deal’ and ‘a deal’ and ensure that Kent residents are not disproportionately 
responsible for additional resource requirements for a national crisis arising out of Dover and 
Folkestone.
• Identify potential community impact when police resources are taken away from communities to meet 
other roles and responsibilities as a result of Brexit.
• Identify key resource needs for public services in run up to March 2019 and ensure they are in place in 
a timely manner.
• Examine the need for an effective, ground-breaking model that contains the entire spectrum of 
internal security capabilities between the UK and EU, not merely a ‘pick n mix’ approach. 
In the final analysis, it is the findings from the survey, taken from existing law enforcement officers 
engaged in international cooperation and collaboration between the UK and other EU Member States that 
is consistent and insightful. It is here that the future post Brexit practical cooperation or, the potential lack 
of it and its complexities, lie. The existing EU frameworks will now disappear from the UK tool-box. The 
time and resource to replace such effective multi or bi-lateral frameworks is incalculable thus affecting the 
UK’s ability to effectively execute and manage trans-national police cooperation. 
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CIVIL SOCIETY PREPAREDNESS: NATIONAL 
AND COUNTY-BASED RESPONSES 
The report has already used as case studies both the preparation and unrest entailed in the 2011 London 
riots, and the challenges of the 2012 London Olympics. What stakeholders of our border steering 
committee highlighted time and again is that despite the enormous challenges – practical, physical, 
logistical, social, economic and more that Brexit presents, planning for Brexit itself appears sparse at best 
and non-existent at worst. “From the perspective of local communities, and local businesses, there is a 
real sense that they have been left without any information as to what to expect in southeast Kent as an 
immediate impact of Brexit”. To explore whether these perceptions held true, CEFEUS examined the range 
of actors and plans on offer in terms of local and national planning. 
 
The Risks 
A no-deal scenario will put key systems at risk, will put infrastructure under pressure as nothing will be 
built before the UK’s exit and any additional border staff may not be available immediately, it is estimated 
that around 2,000 more border staff will be needed in the event of no deal. Equally businesses will not 
be able to make changes in time in the event of no deal, this is problematic as government can only 
implement some of the changes and they will be reliant on third-parties such as traders to make the 
necessary changes to their systems. 
Government departments have begun civil contingency planning to deal with any potential disruption 
at the border after 29 March 2019. The plans aim to provide ways to cope with issues such as queuing 
in Kent, to ensure that the supplies of goods and medicines are not hampered by increased traffic flows 
around the ports in particular. The UK government has accepted that the first day of a no deal scenario will 
result in the border offering less than optimal functionality, meaning that there may be delays in goods 
crossing the border48. In order to avoid this level of functionality, the government must be aware that 
although materially - the functioning of the border may not drastically change in the short term - it is a 
concern that organised criminals and others will be quick to exploit any weaknesses that they perceive or 
any gaps in the enforcement regime. This issue could also be intensified by the UK’s potential loss of access 
to EU security, law enforcement and criminal justice tools. The National Crime agency49 stated in 2018 that 
any loss to shared EU tools and databases will lead to a fragmented and less effective responsive to crime 
from UK agencies. 
National Government 
To manage potential disruption at the border after 29 March 2019, government departments have begun 
civil contingency planning. In the event that member states apply third country controls to imports from 
the UK, there will be a significant impact on the flow of traffic crossing the border. 
The Border Delivery Group (BDG) has been established to work with departments and the Cabinet 
Office’s Civil Contingencies Secretariat to help put civil contingency plans in place. Plans are 
progressing to cope with issues such as queues of traffic in Kent, and to enable the continued supplies 
of essential goods and medicines. Thus far, the BDG has aided the government’s understanding of the 
changes that will be necessary at the border, and undertaken some work on possible scenarios, mainly 
focusing on no deal and the impact on roll on roll off ports. 
48 https://democracy.kent.gov.uk/documents/s85283/ImportControlsPostBrexitandtheirImpactonKent.pdf
49 http://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/news/1469-nca-statement-on-contingency-planning-in-relation-to-uk-withdrawal-from-the-  
 european-union
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Reviewing the UK government’s preparations thus far, the National Audit Office recently concluded 
that the effectiveness of the BDG’s border planning and delivery has been affected by the uncertainty 
surrounding the ongoing negotiations, a problem affecting virtually all other departments in terms sheer 
reduction of time available to plan and implement any necessary changes to systems or infrastructure at 
the border, increasing the risk of effective border operations. The National Audit Office has also highlighted 
the concern that the BDG only began detailed planning work in relation to the problem of the Irish border 
in July50.
DEXEU: The Department for Exiting the European Union have released a series of technical notices 
providing information to businesses and citizens on the risks facing the UK in the event of a no-deal 
scenario51. DEXEU states that it is still unlikely that the UK will leave the EU without a deal, but that it is 
important to prepare for all eventualities. DEXEU further reiterated that they wish to secure a deal that is 
in the best interests of Britain and that the EU have also been clear in their desire to reach a negotiated 
agreement with the UK. 
National Police 
Plans include mobilising 7,000 officers, which resulted from the lessons learnt from the 2011 London riots. 
Particular attention is focused on the port of Dover, but sources on law enforcement commented that this 
was also a wider issue that encompasses other ports and places where cargo and goods enter the UK. 
Police chiefs have stated that due to government cuts it is in doubt as to whether they would be able to 
send officers across the country to deal with any civil unrest and at the same time ensure that their own 
areas are kept safe52. As outlined above, this has resulted in the possibility of police calling on the military 
for assistance in the case of any outbreaks of civil disorder. There is growing concern that if the immediate 
aftermath of Brexit results in shortages of goods, food or medicine then this could have the potential to 
escalate into disorder. 
Metropolitan Police Commissioner Cressida Dick has further stated that police are preparing for disorder 
at British ports in the event of a no-deal Brexit, but added, “at the movement in planning terms it’s a 
long way off because there are so many uncertainties that could happen”.53 Further, the Ministry of 
Housing, Communities and Local government is advertising roles for “resilience advisor”54, with a limited 
job specification but it does outline that the role will “prepare for, respond to, and recover from civil 
emergencies of all types”. 
Kent Police 
Kent Police have stated that they do not expect riots after the UK exits the EU, with Chief Constable Alan 
Pughsley arguing that nothing will really change in the county in the immediate aftermath of March 29, 
2019. Mr Pughsley added that “from a European point of view55, I think we will be in the same position as 
we are not…British policing is the biggest inputter of intelligence into Europol and Interpol. The European 
partners would not like us not to be part of that either because of the obvious loss of intelligence and 
information” adding that Kent police will continue their bi-lateral agreements with French forces. However 
this account of what will happen post Brexit does not account for the possibility of civil unrest flaring up as 
a result of increased pressure on infrastructure on Kent roads. If there are longer waiting times at the port, 
causing delays for time sensitive goods then this may also contribute to a more antagonistic atmosphere 
in Kent and beyond. Civil unrest may not be the result of Kent Police’s future relationship with European 
policing agencies, but it may be the result of any pressure that is put on the county if the ports become 
clogged.
 
50 https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-45959793
51 https://www.gov.uk/guidance/exiting-the-european-union
52 https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/sep/18/police-chiefs-no-deal-brexit-would-mean-loss-crime-fighting-tools
53 https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/brexit-no-deal-ports-met-police-cressida-dick-dover-immigration-imports-  
 latest-a8532721.html
54 https://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/entry/brexit-civil-emergencies_uk_5bbcd701e4b028e1fe41fea0?guccounter=1&guce_referrer_  
 us=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZ29vZ2xlLmNvLnVrLw&guce_referrer_cs=nBtUsURXAJqKdTn1dAWnFQ
55 https://www.kentonline.co.uk/kent/news/police-chief-plays-down-brexit-riots-190488/
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Kent County Council 
Paul Carter, Leader of Kent County Council, has stated that the Government must maintain its commitment 
to frictionless trade to ensure Kent does not become gridlocked56. He stated that KCC intended to ‘urge the 
UK Government to uphold their commitment to a ‘frictionless as possible’57 border to continue to facilitate 
free-flowing trade and transport throughout Kent.’ Dover District Council meanwhile has created the Dover 
District Brexit Taskforce58 to look at the local effect of Brexit. It includes MPs Charlie Elphicke (Dover and 
Deal) and Craig Mackinlay (South Thanet), in addition to representatives from Kent County Council, Port of 
Dover, Getlink and Dover Council. 
The Dover District Brexit Taskforce has had one meeting thus far and have prioritised:
• A resilient road network.
• Investment for enabling systems to ensure frictionless trade continues and is improved.
• Continued mutual recognition of food and animal health and maximum facilitation between the EU, 
UK government, Port and Hauliers. 
• Clarity from the government to enable readiness on Day One.
• Raising awareness of the specific needs of Dover on as many agendas as possible.
 
56 https://www.kentonline.co.uk/kent/news/carter-keep-to-your-frictionless-trade-promise-183165/
57 https://democracy.kent.gov.uk/documents/s85283/ImportControlsPostBrexitandtheirImpactonKent.pdf
58 https://www.kentonline.co.uk/dover/news/task-to-cope-with-brexit-184914/
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FREIGHT, STRATEGIC ROAD NETWORK, 
AND LOGISTICS
Since the EU Referendum in June 2016, attention has been directed towards the impact Brexit will have 
on Ireland, largely due to the historic troubles that have occurred. However, whereas the Ireland-Northern 
Ireland border has approximately 275 crossing points, the county of Kent has 4 (Dover, Ramsgate, 
Folkestone and Sheerness). Yet, Kent accounts for approximately one third of Britain’s trade in goods with 
the world, the majority of which travels through the Port of Dover and Channel Tunnel.
 
The Kent Imperative
The county of Kent is home to 1.8 million people and a key locale for the majority of British imports and 
exports. Kent hosts three ports: The Port of Dover, the Port of Ramsgate and the Ports of Sheerness, in 
addition to the Folkestone Channel Tunnel link to les Coquelles (Pas-de-Calais). Owing to the geographical 
constraints that exist, Brexit will have a profound effect on Kent, and in particular, freight. It is therefore 
important that the Government understands the nature of what we at CEFEUS call the ‘Kent Imperative’: 
i.e. challenges arising from Brexit currently facing Kent as a frontline county that are strategic in terms of 
impact and critical in terms of preparation time. Britain’s departure from the European Union will likely 
further frustrate these issues and therefore it is important to address the root causes of a range of 3 
anticipated problems: (1) bottlenecks at the ports, (2) overcapacity of HGVs on Kent roads, particularly 
on the M20 and A2, (3) and increased non-designated parking, rather than the symptoms alone.
Context: the Port of Dover and the Channel Tunnel 
 The Port of Dover handles £122 billion worth of goods annually, representing 17% of the UK’s entire trade 
in goods, where 99% of transport is via ‘roll-on, roll-off’ (roro) ferries. The Port of Dover is considered to be 
both the busiest Roro Port in Europe, and the busiest passenger port in the UK59. The Port of Dover alone 
accounts for approximately 10,000 HGVs per day, the equivalent of an 180km queue. Due to the limited 
space (i.e. the port can only accommodate fewer than 1,500 HGVs plus tourist traffic at any one time), 
the Port of Dover must turn over the equivalent of its entire holding space 5-6 times a day, in contrast to 
container ports which does so only every 5-6 days60
Currently, EU trucks account for 99% of freight traffic, with ferry crossing times are roughly 90 minutes. 
The Channel Tunnel also handles approximately £120 billion worth of trade and 1.6 million HGVs per 
annum61, equating to roughly 6,000 HGVs daily. A substantial amount of freight that moves through 
the Channel Tunnel is considered part of the ‘just-in-time’ supply chain, where speed is of the essence. 
The tunnel’s journey time is roughly 35-40 minutes, serviced by Eurotunnel’s fleet of 15 shuttles, with up 
to six running per hour62.The largest product by value that travels through the Channel Tunnel is postal 
and courier freight, valued at £21.5 billion, and food goods, valued at approximately £9.2 billion63.In 
2016, approximately 30% of food consumed in the UK was imported from the EU, with 49% produced 
domestically. Both the Channel Tunnel and the Port of Dover have ambitions to grow. Channel Tunnel is 
expecting growth to increase by up to 30% in the next five years, whereas the Port of Dover estimates 
growth at 2-4% during the same period. 
CEFEUS’s recent trip to the Channel Tunnel revealed the intrinsic nature of the ‘ro-mo’ (roll-on motorway) 
that operates between Folkestone and Coquelles; as a typical Eurotunnel shuttle can carry up to 24 lorries 
with up to six shuttles per hour. But it is also the speed of which the tunnel operates, with the typical 
shuttle spending just 12 minutes for unloading and a further 12 minutes to load the next set of HGVs 
before setting off again. Finally, the limitations of the site in terms of space ensures that any delay will have 
a serious economic and practical impact on the Channel Tunnel. 
59 http://www.doverport.co.uk/administrator/tinymce/source/Oxera%20Port%20of%20Dover%20infographic%20v10.pdf
60 http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/public-accounts-committee/brexit-and-the-future-of- 
 customs/written/71385.pdf)
61 https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/may/27/eurotunnel-tory-brexit-customs-union
62 https://www.kent.gov.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0012/6105/Freight-action-plan.pdf
63 https://www.getlinkgroup.com/uploadedFiles/assets-uk/the-channel-tunnel/180604-EY-Channel-Tunnel-Footprint-Report.pdf 
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1. Bottlenecks at Kent’s Ports
Taken together, the Port of Dover and Channel Tunnel account for approximately one third of Britain’s trade 
in goods. It is estimated that 16,000 HGVs enter through these two entry points every day, with lorries 
spending approximately one fourth of their entire UK journey in Kent. In addition, the county has two 
major routes leading from the ports through to the M25: the M20 and A2. Freight vehicles represent 41% 
of all vehicles on the Kent M20/A20 and M2/A2, with the vast majority of these simply passing through 
Kent to destinations elsewhere in the UK64.
The issues of HGVs in Kent has become increasingly problematic. The decision by French port workers in 
the summer of 2015 to strike resulted in Operation Stack being enforced here in Kent for 32 days, with 
extended stretches of the M20 closed down. The economic effect of Operation Stack was devastating. 
Kent’s economy alone was negatively impacted by £1.5 million each day of the operation, whilst the UK 
economy as a whole took a daily hit of £250 million. As this and other operations have demonstrated, 
minor, small-scale traffic problems escalate quickly with far-reaching impacts both county and country-
wide. Based on our own research, these and other problems are already beginning to deter investors in 
Kent, many of whom are “questioning the long-term viability of remaining in Kent”  
(CEFEUS Interview 2018).
 
 
64  https://www.kent.gov.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0012/6105/Freight-action-plan.pdf
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In 2016-17, 88% of foreign HGVs entering the UK did so via the Channel Strait. For the year 2017-18, 
more vehicles travelled through the Port of Dover than all remaining UK ports combined, compromising of 
approximately 2 million vehicles (57% in total)65.In total, the Channel Tunnel and Port of Dover accounted 
for 4.2 million HGVs in 2016 in addition to 23 million passengers. Based on Department for Transport 
estimates that place HGVs volumes increasing by 43% by 2035, the Port of Dover would be expected to 
handle 3.8 million HGVs.
Many EU HGV drivers need to take a break once they reach the UK, via Dover or Folkestone. This can have 
profound consequences in logistical terms however, with over 1,000 lorries are estimated to be parked in 
key non-designated parking areas in the county, with designated lorry parks already at capacity. Kent differs 
in this respect from Belgium and France, where there are parking facilities every 20/30km on motorways.
Currently, the Port of Dover takes approximately two minutes to process EU HGVs, and between 20-45 
minutes to process a non-EU HGV. An increase in customs processing times will result in delays for HGVs, 
which in turn will cause a build of vehicles as they await processing. This presents a danger to the Port due 
to its limited capacity and will likely cause queues throughout Kent. The Port of Dover estimates that the 
addition of a mere two minutes to the current processing time of EU HGVs to each vehicle (whether UK 
or EU) could cause queues of up to 17 miles on both sides of the Channel, in addition to the likelihood of 
Operation Stack being enforced once a week66.
 
Further, Jean-Marc Puissesseau, Director of the Port of Calais, recently stressed the probability of queues 
up to 30 miles on the French side due to necessary customs and sanitary checks for both UK and EU HGVs 
in the absence of a UK-EU customs deal67. With two thirds of Irish exports to the EU also travelling via 
Britain68, bottlenecks are clearly not merely a British problem (see Appendix 4), but highly impactful on its 
neighbours.
 
What is problematic is the complete lack of a Brexit-specific plan for Dover, to assist the port, and its 
users. A recent survey by the British Chamber of Commerce for instance revealed that 67% of respondents 
did not anticipate changing the UK port they currently use for their operations, with 33% currently not 
planning for additional checks and declarations between the UK and the EU69.
 
2. HGV overcapacity on Kent Roads 
In recent weeks, Highways England and the Department for Transport have unveiled plans for an 
alternative to Operation Stack, entitled Operation Brock. The proposed scheme involves the coast-bound 
side of the M20 between Junctions 8 and 9 serving as a temporary lorry park for up 2,000 HGVs. In turn, 
the London-bound side would adopt a contraflow system, with two directions either way and a speed 
reduction to 50mph. The measures would run for approximately 13 miles between Junctions 8 and 9.
65 https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/707540/roro-april-2017-to-march-2018.pdf
66 http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/public-accounts-committee/brexit-and-the-future-of- 
 customs/written/71385.pdf
67 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/mar/08/customs-checks-will-cause-huge-tailbacks-warns-calais-port-boss
68 https://www.oxera.com/getmedia/f2e7736b-357d-4833-a647-898f1116f29f/Brexit-Implications-for-ports_1.pdf.aspx?ext=.pdf
69 http://www.britishchambers.org.uk/Infrastructure%20Survey%20Part%201%20-%20Port%20Infrastructure.pdf
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Operation Brock 
Operation Brock is generally seen as a more positive alternative to Operation Stack, which the Port of Dover 
has already forewarned could be enforced once a week70. However, it stills brings serious repercussions 
for the county and is considered only a temporary measure, and not an answer to the enormous logistical 
strains arising from customs-induced bottlenecks at Kent ports (above) and increased HGV parking on 
Kent’s roads (below). Dover M.P. Charlie Elphicke has for example argued that A2 be fully dualled, in 
addition to further lorry park spacing provisions, stating that Kent cannot be allowed to turned into ‘one 
rolling lorry park71.
Furthermore, there has been increasing concern over the focus on Kent to provide the solution in the case 
of serious delays at Dover and Folkestone. Already, it has been confirmed that under Operation Brock, 
Dover, Manston Airport and the M20 would all serve as holding facilities for lorries. Recent speculation has 
centered over a possible role for the M26, which serves as the corridor between the M20 through to the 
southern part of the M2572. Media reports have estimated that as a whole, Kent could hold 10,000 lorries 
in exceptional circumstances. Yet, local stakeholders in addition to MPs have been keen to stress that this 
is not a Kent issue, but rather a national issue. As already touched on, the closure of key roads in Kent’s 
strategic transport network will bring serious repercussions to the county, in particular economically. 
 
...Why not pursue a simpler solution and stop HGVs entering Kent in the first place? Why 
should it be the responsibility of the Garden of England to turn into the parking lot of 
England? Most HGVs do not start their journeys in our county, so why not keep them at 
source, as they do in France?  
Tom Tugendhat, M.P. for Tonbridge and Malling, House of Commons debate on M26 
Closures, 25th October 2018
 
70 http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/public-accounts-committee/brexit-and-the-future-of- 
 customs/written/71385.pdf
71 http://www.kentonline.co.uk/dover/news/dont-make-towns-roads-a-rolling-lorry-park-184031/ 
72 https://www.kentonline.co.uk/malling/news/mps-fury-at-secret-plans-to-shut-m26-191376/ 
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Operation Fennel
The Government’s desires to shape a new transport plan for Kent in case of delays at Dover and Folkestone 
comes over the debacle in 2015 when Operation Stack caused serious repercussions to both Kent and the 
country. The resulting effect of the 31 day strike by French workers was the creation of Operation Fennel, 
which operations on a stage process to help ensure that HGVs are placed where possible in strategic places 
before enforcing Operation Stack. To date, Operation Fennel has been successful in that Operation Stack 
has not been enforced since 2015, although it is worth noting that we have not substantive issues at the 
two major points of entry and exit since 2015. 
Dover District Council, The potential impact of Britain leaving the European Union (EU) on the Dover 
district, update October 2018. 
It is important to consider both the direct and indirect impacts of freight on Kent’s highways. Delays to 
HGVs will not only cause serious congestion in the cities and towns connected to the arterial roads across 
Kent, but go on to cause delays to urban and rural locations across the country, impacting communities 
and businesses alike. In particular, as we recently investigated, the healthcare sector faces serious risks73: 
delays in travel on roads to Kent hospitals and clinics could impair the ability to adequately reach and/
or treat patients, especially during emergencies. Further, the UK is currently highly dependent on key 
healthcare items, such as medical isotopes. The notorious half-life span of isotopes (and the sensitive 
nature of medicines and medical hardware) runs a very real risk that delays, small or large, will severely 
impair the quality of the product, and undermine in material terms the subsequent treatment of patients, 
including cancer-sufferers.
 
73 https://www.canterbury.ac.uk/social-and-applied-sciences/psychology-politics-and-sociology/cefeus/docs/CEFEUS-Health-and-Social-Care-  
 report-Mar-2018.pdf 
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The resulting pollution arising from the semi-permanent queuing of HGVs will also be highly detrimental 
for the environmental standards of the county as a whole. Lastly, it is worth noting the increased damage 
the average HGV causes to Kent’s roads network in comparison to the average car, which has been 
suggested to be as much as 136,000 times more74.
 
3. Increased non-designated HGV Parking
In 2015, the then Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne unveiled £250 million to be spent on the 
construction of a lorry park in Stanford, Kent with capacity for around 3,600 vehicles. However, this was 
subsequently scrapped in November 2017 following intense campaigning by locals, with the Government 
yet to reveal what they intend to do going forward to meet the needs of HGVs in the county.
 
An 18 month trial in Ashford on preventing illegal lorry parking on the A20 is set to be expanded after 
initial success75. The trial has seen hauliers clamped at the cost of £150, with an additional penalty charge 
fee issue, and will be expanded to further areas across the county to see if successful.
Freight-Related Legislation
In the last 6 months, it has become clear that licensing to drive HGVs will likely change post-Brexit.
Currently, EU drivers are able to use a single permit for trips between all EU Member States 28 with a
Community Licence, issued by the European Commission. While the EU has been clear that they do not
expect this to continue, it should be noted that EFTA member states (Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway,
Switzerland) also use Community Licences, suggesting that a UK inclusion could be a possibility. From a
UK perspective, Parliament has recently passed the ‘Road Permits and Trailer Registration’ Bill as proposed
by the Secretary of State for Transport. The consultation note released by the Department of Transport in
May 2018 for instance appears to accept that UK freight operators will need permits to operate within
the European Union post-withdrawal date76. This follows on from the European Commission, who made
clear in January that there will be substantially more paperwork involved for freight operators. This includes
UK-issued ‘certificates of professional competence’ no longer being recognised, the need for ‘driver
attestations’ for third states, lack of recognition of driving licences at EU level (instead, state-by-state)
and finally loss of access to the EU’s internal road haulage market77. Finally, the UK’s withdrawal from
the European Union will also bring question marks over its access to EEA (Norway, Liechtenstein, Iceland)
states and Switzerland over freight, which have agreements with the EU.
In terms of road transportation agreements, Britain will likely need to negotiate bilateral agreements
with each EU member state post-Brexit, regardless of the economic model it chooses to adopt with the
European Union. The Treaty of Lisbon allows the individual member states to negotiate international
road transportation agreements with third78. However, as with Turkey, which has a partial Customs Union
with the EU, this is far from assured; Turkey itself currently has 25 bilateral agreements covering road
transportation (with Cyprus, Ireland and Malta being the exceptions).
 Finally, Kent County Council Trading Standards have stated that they expected checks at Dover to increase 
from around two a month to two a day in order to prevent counterfeit goods entering the UK. This would 
represent an annual rise in checks from 24 to 73076. This in turn could place a heavy burden on freight 
transportation, as goods are impounded for around a day whilst checked, which could disturb logistic 
planning. As above, there is also real concern as to whether Dover has anywhere near the required capacity 
to carry out the required checks and impounding services.
74 https://bettertransport.org.uk/media/20-march-2018-FTA-false-claims 
75 http://www.kentonline.co.uk/ashford/news/minister-hails-clampdown-on-lorry-fly-parking-183369/ 
76 http://www.kentonline.co.uk/kent/news/huge-rise-in-border-checks-161366/
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Recent Events / European Responses 
As examined in the final part of this report, port-to-port collaboration is crucial in understanding the 
pressures, and indeed the preparations needed for both UK and European port operators, and the wide 
range of freight operators, freight forwarders, logistics and road operators, and more. European partners 
are clearly in need of information for their own planning. Representatives from the ports of Calais and 
Zeebrugge, in addition to Eurotunnel, recently stated to a cross-party Treasury Select Committee that they 
collectively required more details on the UK’s post-Brexit plans, to ensure that adequate arrangements are 
in place once the UK leaves the European Union77. In addition, following an in-depth visit to the Port of 
Calais to review existing infrastructure, the French National Assembly’s Brexit sub-committee took evidence 
on Thursday 21st June from the Port of Calais, Port of Dunkirk and the French Customs Service78. The final 
outcome of this were the following possible arrangements to be put in place by the Government of France, 
in the event of a no-deal Brexit79. A no-deal Brexit Bill was recently unveiled by the French Government 
highlighting the issue of British nationals currently residing in France, in addition to freight transport 
operators seeking to operate between the UK and France. The bill, if approved, would allow the French 
Government to draft legislation to deal with the issues highlighted to ensure that the concerns were 
addressed quickly.
77 https://www.kentonline.co.uk/kent-business/county-news/port-chiefs-warn-over-brexit-uncertainty-184177/
78 http://www2.assemblee-nationale.fr/15/missions-d-information/missions-d-information-de-la-conference-des-presidents/suivi-des-  
 negociations-liees-au-brexit/(block)/45796
79 https://www.scribd.com/document/391136629/French-Brexit-Bill
40
Policy Suggestions
Kent-Specific Brexit Bill: As outlined, Brexit may likely have a far more a profound effect on the county of 
Kent, at least initially, than any other location in England. ‘Kent Imperatives’ therefore represent challenges 
arising from Brexit currently facing Kent as a frontline county that are strategic in terms of impact and 
critical in terms of preparation time. While a range of issues arising from Brexit will ultimately impact on 
the county, freight - and its related issues of customs, logistics, safety, security, and the guaranteed supply 
and sale of key goods represent the most critical Kent Imperatives at this time.
 
From this perspective, a legislative bill addressing in sequential fashion the Brexit-specific Kent Imperatives, 
and freight is a reasonable place to begin. The hierarchy of freight begins with the triad of issues that will 
become acute in the short-term: (1) bottlenecks at the ports, (2) overcapacity of HGVs on Kent roads, 
particularly on the M20 and A2, (3) and increased non-designated parking. These lead on to decisions to 
take advantage of medium-term issues including related infrastructural projects, funding, priority status for 
goods of national importance and easing of legislative burdens. Infrastructure projects would be crucial 
additions that are necessary to mitigate the increased ‘friction’ across Kent, such as the duelling of the 
A2 into Dover, increased used of rail freight and optimizing improvements around the proposed Lower 
Thames Crossing. At a minimum, the creation of a Kent-specific inter-ministerial strategic group working 
from DExEU, and in direct cooperation with Kent County Council should be swiftly put in place.
 
Port Bottlenecks
Common Transit Convention (CTC): The committee should look into the advantages of signing up 
to the CTC, which could allow freight to move freely until reaching its final destination, with HGVs 
making necessary declarations and tariffs at the final destination rather than initiating location. Properly 
implemented, the CTC could allow the UK to trade freely with non-EU states, and possibly implemented 
as part of a customs regime agreed with the EU itself, allowing goods to move with reduced delays, and 
reducing the burden on ports and ancillary infrastructure. The Government outlined this as an option 
under the ‘highly streamlined customs arrangement’ in the August 2017 position paper on Customs.80 
 
Redirection of Goods: It is also clear that greater thought needs to be placed on how to handle the 
customs process post-Brexit, in particular as this will have a direct impact on freight. Several reports have 
indicated that the average HGV’s final destination is in the Midlands, and this is often reflected in surveys 
on construction of infrastructure such as the Lower Thames Crossing. Under the assumption that Britain 
leaves the Single Market and Customs Union, checks will have to take place, and will likely increase the 
burden on Kent.
 
Rationalisation / redirection of freight: during times of increased or prolonged overcapacity, the 
Government should consider the rationalisation / redirection of freight based on strategic requirements. 
Just-in-time goods (perishable and degradable) including medical isotopes, medical equipment, 
dairy, vegetables and fruit, and key components within extended supply chains (e.g. automotive and 
aeronautical) go via Kent. Non-time bound goods could be rerouted (at least temporarily) to alternative 
ports such as Felixstowe and Hull. However, it is important that any solution found in the UK is applied 
equally to Calais and Dunkirk, due to the ‘closed loop’ system that operates.
 
Priority Permits: To supplement the redirection of goods, whether temporarily or permanent, priority 
permits could be considered for freight companies carrying goods of strategic importance. Equally, this 
same logic could be expanded to incorporate special lanes at ports, faster processing time at customs or 
even waving through checks; subject to capacity at existing ports.
 
Increasing Capacity of Other Ports: Whilst the Port of Dover and Eurotunnel will likely continue to 
dominate Britain’s freight market, it is important to incentivise alternative ports such as the Ramsgate and 
Sheerness by encouraging them to increase capacity, in addition to non-Kent options such as Newhaven 
and Poole. This can be done either by reducing tax obligations such as business rates, which in turn will 
provide a discount to freight operators, or the creation of free-ports for areas that are particularly deprived. 
See the Ports Profile at the end of this report for much more detail in this respect. 
80  HM Government, 2017, pg.8.
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HGV Overcapacity and Non-designated Parking
Operation Brock: Consultation with key stakeholders across Kent to ensure that vital feedback is provided 
on the proposed alternative to Operation Stack.. The day before the temporary measure was unveiled, Paul 
Carter, the Leader of Kent County Council, stated the following: Should traffic flow be disrupted due to 
delays at the port for any reason, the M20 and M2 must be kept open in both directions at all times. This 
will require timely decisions and appropriate investment by the government81.
 
Lorry Parks: It has been identified by the Government that additional lorry parks are necessary to relieve 
the burden on the county. However, the preference to build one big lorry park in Kent is illogical and 
inconsistent in comparison to our European counterparts, and would continue to place an unnecessary 
burden on the county. In consultation with Kent County Council, Kent Police, Kent Invicta Chamber of 
Commerce and other key stakeholders, we would propose a series of lorry parks around the country with 
the use of smart technology on motorways to encourage drivers to stop before reaching the county. 
In addition, the currently converted Manston Airport is seen as a short-term solution brought in after 
Operation Stack in July 2015, largely due to the poor roads that lead to it and its geographic location 
in relation to the ports. The issue of freight after Brexit affect 1.8 million Kent residents, approximately 
75,000 business and will have a serious bearing on future investment and regeneration in the area. 
Further, the whole of the UK economy depends on the road infrastructure of this region for the timely 
provision of goods and services in a manner that may bring repercussions if not adequately addressed. If 
the issues raised are not suitably addressed by the Government in the coming months, freight threatens 
the UK’s future prosperity potentially as much as any other “Brexit” issue.
81  http://www.kentonline.co.uk/kent/news/carter-keep-to-your-frictionless-trade-promise-183165/ 
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THE BORDER, AND CUSTOMS:  
FRONTLINE KENT 
In preparing this section, the following national and local reports have been instructive: 
National Reports 
Report Key Findings
Institute for 
Government: 
“Implementing 
Brexit”82
1. The constraints at the physical border should be recognised to limit the activity required at 
key ports or crossings
2. “There is neither the time nor the space to simply expand the infrastructure capacity, and 
even if there was there are further questions about how expanded facilities would be staffed”
3. “A meaningful transition period will offer all those involved the time to make the necessary 
adjustments – such as building new facilities, hiring and training new staff, connecting the 
expanded capacity into existing infrastructure and allowing businesses to qualify for AEO 
status”
Institute for 
Government: 
“Frictionless 
trade?”83
1. “The only option that preserves the status quo is the status quo”
2. “The Government needs to fully understand the costs to business from disrupting supply 
chains – and the sources of those costs (rules of origin, regulatory checks, potential border 
delays) – and weigh them against the benefits of, for example, more regulatory flexibility or 
the ability to negotiate new trade deals”
3. “In the short run, at least, agriculture looks to be a specific problem, catered for by neither 
the current models of EEA membership nor the Turkish Customs Union agreement. This 
suggests that the UK would need some sort of transitional deal that came as close as possible 
to replicating the status quo while systems were put in place, capacity built and long-term 
details agreed”
House of 
Lords: “Brexit: 
the customs 
challenge”84
1. “Customs procedures do not start at the border, but well before that. This requires resources 
to retrieve the necessary information, even if the information is not ultimately submitted by 
businesses themselves, but outsourced to customs brokers or freight forwarders”
2. “HMRC have estimated that, overall, the cost to UK businesses under ‘no deal’ would be £18 
billion per year”
3. “Customs procedures are likely to rely increasingly on electronic data in the future, rather 
than on paper declarations. We welcome the Government’s consideration of single-window 
technology, which would provide traders with a single point of interaction with various UK 
Government agencies”
Institute of 
Directors: 
“Customising 
Brexit: A hybrid 
option for a 
UK-EU trade 
framework”85
1. “The precedent of its arrangement with Turkey acts as a useful base for the UK to build on, 
particularly given the EU’s commitment to redressing asymmetries already identified under 
that agreement”
2. “The UK will have its independent trade policy restored no matter how it exits the EU”
3. “We should not, however, think of the future relationship between the UK and EU as static. 
It is both likely and desirable that this deal be constructed as a “living agreement”, capable of 
growing and evolving over time”
National Audit 
Office: “The 
UK border: 
preparedness 
for EU exit”86
1. “Effective management of the border is critical for the UK after it leaves the EU”
2. “If the government reaches a withdrawal agreement with the EU, industry and government 
will have until December 2020 to design and implement any new arrangements. This could 
involve significant work, such as the implementation of new customs arrangements, and the 
time available to meet these challenges is not long compared to many complex government 
programmes”
3. “If there is no withdrawal agreement, the government has recognised that the border will 
be ‘less than optimal’. We agree with this assessment, and it may take some time for a fully 
functioning border to be put in place. Individuals and businesses will feel the impact of a 
sub-optimal border to varying degrees”
82 https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/IfG_Brexit_customs_WEB_0.pdf , p. 32.
83 https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/5704%20IFG%20-%20Frictionless%20Trade%20Web_0.pdf,  
 pp. 38-9.
84 https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201719/ldselect/ldeucom/187/187.pdf , pp. 50-51
85 https://www.iod.com/Portals/0/PDFs/Campaigns%20and%20Reports/Europe%20and%20trade/IoD-Customising-Brexit.   
 pdf?ver=2018-02-15-083137-800 , p. 10
86 https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/The-UK-border-preparedness-for-EU-exit.pdf , p. 11.
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County-Specific Reports 
Report Key Findings
Kent County 
Council Trading 
Standards: 
“Import Controls 
Post-Brexit and 
their Impact on 
Kent”87
1. “The legal gateway for goods to be detained provided by RAMS must continue so that 
potentially unsafe/noncomplying goods can be identified by UKBF, communicated to 
Trading Standards, and where appropriate be prevented from entry”
2. “the powers available should place the burden of non-compliance on the importer for 
non-complying or dangerous goods, and not require Trading Standards to take the 
financial burden of paying for storage automatically”
3. “as resources are limited any intelligence that provides for effective targeting is beneficial. 
We would urge that we retain access to and contribute towards the market surveillance 
systems to ensure we are able to identify, prevent and remove unsafe goods from the UK 
marketplace”
Dover District 
Council: “The 
potential impact 
of Britain leaving 
the EU on the 
Dover district”88
1. “Capacity problems within the Port of Dover, and the knock-on effects on transport flows 
within the district, and wider transport network, are a major concern. We therefore need 
urgent clarity on post Brexit arrangements, adequate support to keep trade flowing and 
transport networks moving and need to consider contingency plans for the possibility of a 
hard/ high-friction Brexit”
2. “Operation Brock, the interim plan to avoid cross-channel congestion, needs to be 
delivered before any change to customs arrangements in March 2019, but a start date for 
necessary road works has not yet been announced and there does not appear to be a Plan 
B”
3. “It is vital that there is adequate legislation, -facilities, resourcing and authorised 
competent staff to provide the necessary checks for food safety in the Dover Port Health 
district”
Context
On 29 March, 2019, the United Kingdom (UK) is scheduled to leave the European Union (EU). The first 
major change will be the change in the UK’s status from an EU Member State - operating within the EU, 
the Single Market, and the Customs Union – to that of a non-member state and a third country under EU 
law. 
As of November 2018, the UK government is still negotiating the terms of the withdrawal from the EU, 
including the precise the text of the Withdrawal Treaty, as well as a framework for its future relationship 
with the EU. Presently, government departments, as well as local government and customs-related 
agencies are planning for two eventualities:
• a successful conclusion of negotiations, with a UK-EU ‘deal’ reached. This would be based on 
some version of the draft Withdrawal Agreement (published earlier this year) and entail a transition 
period until December 2020 (or possibly longer). During this time the UK would remain within, or 
closely aligned to the EU customs union and/or Single Market. In practical terms, most EU law would 
continue to apply to the UK, with many day-to-day arrangements largely unchanged until the end of 
the transition period, including customs and border arrangements. 
• an unsuccessful conclusion of negotiations, resulting in a ‘no deal’ scenario. This would entail 
neither a Withdrawal Agreement, nor an implementation period. No longer under the aegis of EU law, 
the UK would revert instantly to third party status, with an instant change in the UK-EU relationship 
as of 30 March 2019 (the day after leaving the EU). The manner of this change will have profound 
implications for the movement of goods, people, services, and other areas of multi-level cooperation 
including data-sharing and internal and external security.89 
87 https://democracy.kent.gov.uk/documents/s85283/ImportControlsPostBrexitandtheirImpactonKent.pdf , pp. 11-12.
88 http://eureferendum.com/documents/000a%20Dover%20Report.pdf , pp. 5-6.
89 A possible halfway house between the two outcome (mitigating the impacts of a ‘no deal’ scenario) depends on whether the UK and EU can  
 reach stand-alone (and possibly short-term) agreements on sector-specific issues including travel, data-sharing and customs arrangements  
 before March 2019. 
Britain’s management of its border (both in Britain, and via juxtaposed border controls in France and 
Belgium) has of course been heavily influenced both by its membership of the EU, and the specific 
principles of the EU Single Market, which allows for the free movement of goods, services, capital and 
people across all 28 Member States. 
However, in the likely absence of a deal in which the UK feasibly remains within the Customs Union and/
or the Single Market, it is necessary to accept, and prepare for the profound range of implications for 
managing the UK’s border, beginning in Kent. This is simply because a ‘no deal’ scenario from 29 March 
2019 or any stage thereafter means that all aspects of good, services, capital and people will be instantly 
altered by virtue of being outside the Single Market and Customs Union, and the need for a range of 
regulatory and multi-level customs checks. 
To be clear, absent a customs, market or regulatory agreement with the EU, all trade between the UK and
the EU would be governed by World Trade Organization (WTO) rules on the basis of the ‘most favoured
nation’ (MFN) principle, as illustrated in Annex 1, extracted from the October 2018 National Audit Office
report. This new status requires a new system, one in which new customs controls, tariffs and non-tariff
barriers would apply to approximately £423 billion of trade at Britain’s various border ports. This in turn
will require national government, agencies, and local government to swiftly construct “new systems,
upgrade existing systems and make extensive other changes”.90
MFN: the WTO principle requiring non-discrimination between trading partners and the consistent 
application of customs checks, tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade. 
Current Customs Operations 
UK Customs is carried out by a range of entitles public and private sector organisations. The UK 
Government collects the duties on goods, and conducts checks. Private sector agents however, including 
port operators, clearance agents and freight forwarders, provide key infrastructure, logistics, personnel 
and forms. Adaptations to Brexit scenarios, whether soft/hard, or no deal relies heavily on all these entities 
being prepared. As of November 2018, they have five months remaining. 
Border Management: Who’s Who 
• Responsibility for the UK border is spread across a wide number of relevant government departments 
either through policymaking or through the operating of controls at the border itself. 
• Of these departments, the most important are Border Force (within the Home Office), HM Revenue 
& Customs (HMRC), the Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs (Defra) and the 
Department for Transport. 
• The operation of the border is also affected by a variety of private sector actors including ferry 
companies, airlines, couriers, freight forwarders and customs brokers. Added to this many private 
sector firms also operate entry-points to the UK via sea ports, airports and rail via the Eurotunnel.
• The Department for Exiting the European Union (DExEU) has been given responsibility for 
managing and co-ordinating all exit-issues, which includes exit-issues regarding the border. 
• After undertaking scoping work the Cabinet Office created the Border Planning Group in March 2017 
to conduct cross-government oversight and was supported by a border coordination team which was 
expanded in April 2018. 
• After its expansion, the group became known as the Border Delivery Group. This group is currently 
hosted by HMRC and reports to the Chief Executive of HMRC and the Second Permanent Secretary at 
the Home Office
90 National Audit Office, The UK border: preparedness for EU exit, HC 1619, 24 October 2018, https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/  
 uploads/2018/10/The-UK-border-preparedness-for-EU-exit.pdf
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Customs Declarations 
One key area of concern is the need to make customs declarations. This includes approximately 180,000 
traders making customs declarations for the very first time, on or after 29th March 2019, both large 
companies and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Assistance from DEXEU has been less than 
forthcoming in this respect, with technical notices providing a minimum of clarity and support, stating 
simply that ‘businesses should consider how a no deal scenario could affect them, and may want to 
begin taking steps to mitigate against such a risk, however unlikely’91. The onus for managing increased 
administration, training, software, personnel and of course the costs of adaptation to Brexit changes, falls 
squarely on businesses at this point. The Institute for Government argues that 
“the introduction of customs declarations alone could end up costing traders in the region 
of £4 billion (bn) a year. For these traders to be ready for exit, government must be clear about 
when and how they must adapt, and leave them enough time to do so. Until they are given 
some certainty on what is required from them on day one, the amount of this work that can 
take place is limited”.92 
Based on work with government departments, as well as investigations at the UK border in Kent, the NAO 
made the following 9 strategic observations regarding the current state of play of the UK border, in terms 
of its preparedness, including customs93: 
• The effectiveness of departments’ border planning and delivery has been affected by ongoing 
uncertainty and delays in negotiations: The uncertainty from the ongoing UK-EU negotiations has 
made it dif cult to make clear planning assumptions. Delays in UK-EU negotiations have reduced the 
time available to departments to plan and implement new border regimes that might be required. 
• The Border Delivery Group (BDG) has improved government’s understanding of the changes 
that need to be put in place at the border but it has not been able to address all areas of its 
responsibilities. BDG has undertaken some work on all scenarios and locations but has focused its 
efforts on preparations for ‘no deal’ and the impact at ports described as ‘roll-on, roll-off’ (RORO) such 
as the Dover ferry port, but not detailed work regarding Northern Ireland. 
• Planning for border operations in the event of a ‘deal’ is less developed than that for ‘no deal’ 
because of the ongoing uncertainty regarding the nature of the future relationship between the UK 
and the EU. With a deal, government departments expect little immediate change at the border: i.e. 
the scale of implementing a ‘deal’ would be much less significant than the work required to be ready 
for a ‘no deal’. 
• High non-delivery risk for border programmes for ‘day one of no deal’ due to their scale, 
complexity and urgency. This concerns: 11 of the 12 major border systems being unready by March 
2019, required infrastructure to examine goods cannot be built in time, additional staff, training, 
security clearance possibly not available.
As of October 2018, Border Force plans to recruit 581 full-time equivalent additional operational staff 
and intends to increase numbers over the months following EU exit. Border Force’s estimate of additional 
staff is based on incomplete information from departments and there is some uncertainty on what the 
future regime will be. Border Force has estimated that it could require around 2,000 staff to meet all 
requirements in the event of ‘no deal’, such as full compliance with WTO rules and other international 
obligations. Given the uncertainty, and the length of time to recruit, security clear and train staff, Border 
Force acknowledges that there is therefore a significant risk that it will not deploy all the staff it plans to 
recruit by 29 March 2019. However, Border Force will only be required to enforce a reduced compliance 
regime on ‘day one of no deal’. Border Force is also establishing a readiness task force of 300 staff who 
can be deployed to help meet peaks in demand and allow existing staff to be trained in new requirements. 
It expects to have 281 of these in place by the end of December 2018. 
91 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/trading-with-the-eu-if-theres-no-brexit-deal/trading-with-the-eu-if-theres-no-brexit-deal
92 Institute for Government, Implementing Brexit: Customs, 2018, https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/  
 IfG_Brexit_customs_WEB_0.pdf
93 https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/The-UK-border-preparedness-for-EU-exit.pdf, pp. 7-10.
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• Businesses do not have enough time to make the changes needed for a ‘no deal, and government 
departments can only implement some of the border changes required. Border efficiency is heavily 
dependent on third parties making informed changes, many of whom will need to comply with 
customs, regulatory or other processes for the first time: including between 145,000 and 250,000 
traders.  
• The most complex border issues for a ‘no deal’ scenario remain unresolved: customs 
arrangements at the Northern Ireland and Ireland land border, and designing and implement a system 
to allow RORO ferry ports and the Eurotunnel to operate smoothly. 
• In the event of ‘day one of no deal’ the border will be ‘less than optimal’: the UK government 
does not have enough time to put in place all of the infrastructure, systems and people required for 
fully effective border operations on day one. 
• The UK may face gaps in its enforcement regime, arising from the potential loss of access to EU 
security, law enforcement and criminal justice tools. To avoid a long period of sub-optimal ‘no deal’ 
border functioning, working swiftly to reduce the risk of cross-border crime is key. 
• To manage potential disruption at the border after 29 March 2019, government departments have 
begun civil contingency planning.
Customs in Figures 
National Audit Office, The UK border: preparedness for EU exit (24 October 2018), p.4 
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‘No Deal’ Border Operations 
As the October 2018 report by the National Audit Office made clear, UK government departments “accept 
that border operations will be less than optimal on day one and have acknowledged that all of the 
necessary systems, infrastructure and people cannot be put in place for day one.” Nor have departments 
estimated precisely “how soon border operations would return to the capability and performance they had 
before the UK left the EU”. The risks therefore include: 
• delays for goods crossing the border;
• increased chances for tax and regulatory non-compliance;
• less information to inform checks of people crossing the border. 
This assumes that most traders will declare identifiable owed duties, but does not preclude the possibility 
that criminal elements may swiftly exploit border vulnerabilities.
UK government’ border planning priorities:
• Security and safety
• Flow of people and goods
• Compliance activity (including the collection of revenue)
Possible Customs Arrangements 
Emerging from the contentious series of proposals embedded within the Spring 2018 ‘Chequers Deal’ 
outlined by Prime Minister May, in July 2018, the government subsequently proposed a new customs and 
compliance model. The July model replaced both the Highly Streamlined Customs Arrangement, and the 
New Customs Partnership models that were proposed by DEXEU in August 2017 with a new Facilitated 
Customs Arrangement (FCA). 
As proposed by HMRC, the FCA operates on the basis that the UK and the EU both share a combined 
customs territory, removing the need for the majority of checks and controls. As of November 2018, UK 
governments departments appear to have revised their planning toward the FCA but remain as yet unclear 
on how it would operate in detail or in practice. 
CEFEUS research trips to the Port of Dover, and to Folkestone, highlighted that operators and carriers of 
all stripes were not a position to prepare clearly for either a ‘deal’ outcome involving a transition period, 
and post-transition period, or a ‘no deal’ scenario, due to the profound lack of clarity as to the nature, or 
likelihood of a deal, and the general and specific implications for border activity. At present, it seems that 
HMRC is “unable to complete design work on the future customs model until there have been further 
negotiations with the EU. HMRC has previously estimated that it could take up to three years to implement 
a new model from the time when there is certainty about a decision.”94
94  NAO, October 2018, op. cit., p.27. 
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Facilitated Customs Arrangement: HM Treasury/ HMRC Insights
CEFEUS participated as rapporteur in a meeting hosted by Kent Chambers of Commerce in August 2018, 
and was able to clarify some of the basic functions of the propose FCA, as presented by representatives 
from HMRC and HM Treasury. What follows is a precis of the presentation, questions and observations 
that comprised that meeting, with the permission of those present. It should however be observed that 
the assumption was for a deal that not only saw the UK retaining a clear customs structure with the EU, 
but a negotiated Withdrawal Treaty and transition period. None of what follows is therefore likely under a 
no-deal scenario. 
In terms of the rationale behind the proposed FCA, and as outlined by the Government White Paper, the 
ultimate goal was to ensure that UK transactions with the EU remained unaffected, continuing to operate 
seamlessly, while enabling the UK to operate an independent trade policy. Second, the proposed FCA 
forms part of the UK’s Future Economic Partnership, which covers goods, regulations, common rule book, 
data sharing to monitor trade and elimination of tariffs/quotas. Further, the FCA was chosen over other 
prospective models for the following reasons: 
1. to protect existing trade flows with EU;
2. to prevent a hard Irish border; 
3. to protect the integrity of Single Market and the Customs Union;
4. to ensure an independent UK trade policy;
5. requires no fundamental shifts from other EU member states to continue trading with Britain.
In operational terms, the FCA would remove the need for customs declarations as otherwise necessary 
post-Brexit, although existing reporting arrangements (e.g. EC Sales Lists) would still be necessary. As of 
August 2018, the UK government believed that the FCA was aligned with the EU Council’s guidelines from 
March 2018, including customs.
The proposed FCA involves applying EU tariff and trade policy for those goods that are to be 
consumed within EU, and applying UK tariffs for goods consumed within the UK.
The Facilitated Customs Arrangement’s two-tariff system: 
• Trusted Trader businesses that can be demonstrate that the goods will be consumed in the UK, can be 
pre-authorised to pay the lower UK tariff (assuming that the UK tariff is lower than EU).
• Other businesses will need to initially pay higher tariff, but can reclaim that tariff in one of two 
ways: (1) for goods that have been consumed in the UK; (2) for goods that have been substantially 
transformed into a UK good.
Trusted Traders: may pay a lower tariff if they can demonstrate the destination of consumption of the 
goods; if so, they will be in the lower tariff jurisdiction. ‘Domestic consumption’ refers to goods that meet 
any of the UK’s origin rules (e.g. sales of UK goods to final consumer or wastage could count as part 
of ‘domestic consumption’ process). Only Trusted Trader businesses can do the calculations on tariffs 
themselves. Businesses are expected to retain evidence on how they have reached their calculation in a 
way not dissimilar to VAT. The Customs Declaration Service would “do the calculation” of the amounts 
due under each tariff regime based on information provided. The Trusted Trader would then be eligible to 
select the lower tariff.
Assessing the destination of consumption could potentially be done in a variety of ways (e.g. 
assumptions based on proportion based on last year sales). As sales adjust, traders will pay more or less 
accordingly. Each arrangement will depend on the level of trust in the relationship and final arrangements 
subject to negotiations. Duty drawbacks will still apply outside the EU. In terms of VAT implications for 
European customers, it was observed that VAT & Excise should not be cause for additional border checks. 
The point of FCA was to propose a common approach on both side to duplicate the current status. Import 
VAT was cited as an example (e.g. entirely status quo driven at present). 
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Businesses that import from third states /non-EU states (e.g. China) before disseminating product across 
the UK/EU, and are unsure of product destination at time of arrival will pay the higher tariff initially before 
reclaiming once aware of where product has been sent. Businesses will need to improve their monitoring 
of all aspects of their supply chains accordingly, if they wish to benefit from lower tariffs. Changes in 
tariffs may make it more challenging to export to third states such as China. However, a key thrust of 
the proposed FCA is its ability to replicate the same tariffs initially, while allowing the UK to operate an 
independent trade policy. 
Improving supply chain monitoring will be key. The ultimate responsibility is that of the importer who 
is paying the tariffs. Importers may therefore wish to monitor how a given product is being used in order 
to benefit from prospective lower tariffs. Otherwise may wish to pass costs and the eligibility for the tariff 
repayment onto their customer. If, for example, a company is selling to two different suppliers at the same 
time, the importer ought to know that certain goods are going to different areas. If they are a part of the 
Trusted Trader scheme, they can pay a proportion of those goods at the lower tariff as appropriate. If not, 
than will need to initially pay higher tariff before reclaiming.
Gaining Authorised Economic Operator (AEO) status can be a lengthy process, and not always 
appropriate for all traders. AEO status is different to the future Trusted Trader status envisaged for 
obtaining the correct tariff up front. Importers and exporters alike need to consider which of these 
options is most beneficial, particularly if tariff differentials are negligible. The general feeling from the UK 
government is for plans to make the Trusted Trader status option far quicker and simpler. 
 
Free Trade Deals: In terms of the UK continuing to trade in the same way with EU associate members (e.g. 
Israel), the UK government is still looking at states such as Turkey to identify ways of maintaining simplified 
procedures, and is seeking to roll over extant Free Trade Agreements with these states, including reciprocal 
market access. In terms of whether trade tariffs likely to be reciprocated, it was noted that for an FTA to 
be approved by the WTO, the majority of tariff lines need to be reduced to 0. The majority of UK trade in 
goods with non-EU partners is currently in finished goods, which are more likely to take advantage of the 
correct (established) tariff at the border. The FCA is concerned exclusively with goods; services will require a 
separate agreement with the EU.
In terms of the proposed timetable, a successfully negotiated deal with the EU would see a probably 
Implementation Period run from March 2019 to December 2020. The UK government would seek a 
phased approach to implementation of the FCA. In the event of a no deal, it was pointed out that the 
government has released a series of technical notes to assist businesses in addressing some of their 
concerns. Further, that the Government is working on no-deal plans with Ministers prioritising the flow of 
trade. Lastly, that the Government would introduce ‘postponed accounting’ for Import VAT.
 
Outstanding issues included the need to agree precise arrangements necessary for the management of 
the UK border, beginning with Dover, including regulatory information, data-sharing and other customs 
mechanisms necessary for remitting the appropriate level of tariffs back to the EU. It was also observed 
that those working and residing within Kent have specific concerns regarding the serious likelihood of 
delay at the border arising from increased checks on vehicles, and the lack of logistical space at Dover. The 
response was that several visits to the Port of Dover had been undertaken by various departments. The 
point of the proposed FCA however was to avoid checks at the border. 
The conclusions drawn as of November 2018 have to take into consideration the EU’s present perspective 
on both the original Chequers Plan, and the proposed Facilitated Customs Arrangement (FCA). Neither are 
presently deemed workable, leaving both sides at something of an impasse. 
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Policy Suggestions for Customs and the UK Border: What Needs to 
Happen Now? 
Customs represents the single greatest challenge facing the UK Government in its goal of implementing 
Brexit. On the basis of proposals made in previous CEFEUS reports in conjunction with regional 
stakeholders, and supporting the perspectives outlined in the above-mentioned national and regional 
reports, the following recommendations are made: 
Immediate Priority (November 2018-March 2019)
• In the event of a ‘no deal’: immediate provision of information, support, and personnel to ensure 
all traders large and small having to make customs declarations (in the UK and EU) are CLEAR on the 
requirements.
• Swift resolution of each of the 12 major border systems, as identified by the Border Delivery Group, 
in time for March 2019, starting with the 11 incomplete projects.
• Central government commitment to drastically improving the number of staff in key ministries, and 
based locally in Kent (with Dover and Folkestone a priority) with direct remit to solve border issues: UK 
security, UK customs and community/logistical safety being top priorities. 
• Hiring, as suggested by Border Force, fully 2000 full-time equivalent additional Border Force staff 
to meet all requirements in the event of ‘no deal’, such as full compliance with WTO rules and other 
international obligations. Ensuring that a ‘readiness task force’ core of no fewer than 500 full-
time equivalent staff are deployed to Dover, Folkestone, Holyhead, Harwich, Belfast, Grimsby and 
Immingham, Hull and beyond from the end of December 2018. 
• Enhanced central government support to private sector agents responsible for strategic border delivery 
services, including staff, training, and software. 
• In the event of a deal: immediate provision of information, support, and personnel to ensure all 
traders large and small are aware of how the agreed customs arrangement will operate (e.g the 
Facilitated Customs Arrangement’s two-tariff system). 
• HMRC must prioritise the delivery of its ICT ‘Customs Declaration Services’ programme in its current 
form, delivering the basics before introducing new functionality. 
• DEXEU should seek to negotiate continued access to EU customs systems, in particular the EU’s New 
Computerised Transit System (NCTS), and the Common Transit Convention. 
Post Brexit Priority (March 2019-2021)
• HMRC should replicate the Union Customs Code (UCC) in its entirety for its immediate post-Brexit 
plans. The UK’s existing customs system is designed around this and keeping it will help to ensure 
continuity. 
• HMRC should provide a fast-track to both Authorised Economic Operator and Trusted Trader status, 
proving options for traders, but on the basis of ‘offering differing tiers’ within both statuses, including 
an easy option geared to SMEs. 
• Allocating government funds to offset the costs of Brexit for SMEs, rolled out from March 2019 
onwards, including offsetting the costs of applying for AEO or Trusted Trader Status, personnel, 
software, training, logistical changes, as outlined in DEXEU’s technical notices.
• Working with the EU on mutual recognition schemes, beginning with AEO and Trusted Trader.
• Should the above-mentioned Facilitated Customs Arrangement (FCA) be put in place (or something 
similar), clarity on how goods will be tracked, the cost incurred to business in this respect, clarity on 
liability, fraud and competitive fairness, on what constitutes ‘sufficient information’ of intermediate 
goods in terms of tracking goods, the FPA repayment mechanism (at present unique and untested). 
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BRITISH AND EUROPEAN PORT PROFILES 
Ports represent the vital connective arteries in terms of transport and transit, for HGVs, ferries, trains, and 
cars (covering industrial, commercial, tourist, commuter and civilian activities). In exploring and comparing 
their overall activity, ports can be ranked in terms of the sheer volume of traffic that passes through them, 
their geographical location within a given Member State, and their proximity to other ports, which taken 
together, represents their importance as a strategic asset. All the ports examined here are essentially 
‘continental conduits’: permitting trade not merely be virtue of their physical location and operations, but 
also within the principles of the EU Single Market. 
As such, ports form a visible and viable network for innumerable supply chains, as well as travel, transport 
and transit activities. The table below illustrates the preponderant role that Dover and Folkestone play 
within this network. But the UK is connected to a number of vitally important ports in neighbouring EU 
Member States, including in Ireland, France, the Netherlands, Belgium and Germany. Space forbids a 
truly exhaustive appraisal, but the inclusion of the following seven ports as a ‘strategic annex’ to a report 
exploring the various impact of Brexit on the county of Kent – host to the two largest of Britain’s ports - 
seems appropriate. 
UK: 
• Dover
• Ramsgate 
• Holyhead
EU: 
• Calais, France 
• Dunkirk, France 
• Rotterdam, the Netherlands
• Zeebrugge, Belgium 
Commonalities and Key Themes
• Ports are hugely important to the functioning of both the UK and EU economies which are based on 
timely cross-country logistics chains supplying every conceivable type of goods to and from the UK and 
EU.
• Of the ports profiled all are facing challenges in trying to prepare and assuage the effects of Brexit, 
with the considerable uncertainty as to the exact exit-deal weighing down on efforts to prepare and 
invest in the future, even for a port such as Rotterdam which is considered highly prepared. 
• Apart from Ramsgate, the other six larger ports have all warned to various degrees that they stand to 
lose from the change in trading relationship. 
• The ports which most utilise roll-on / roll-off cargo transportation are likely to both be disrupted more 
and lose more due to the high frequency, high speed model they currently operate under which makes 
them most sensitive to additional delays.
Policy Suggestions
• Uncertainty regarding the end state of the UK-EU Brexit deal has weighed heavily on how ports have 
attempted to prepare for Brexit. A solidified known deal would enable ports to prepare for an scenario 
they can fully plan for.
• As such a Brexit transition of 24 months as is currently intended is crucial as it gives much needed time 
to make these preparations, especially in terms of building new infrastructure to deal with the agreed 
future trading relationship. 
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Key Definitions
Ro-Ro - Roll-on / Roll-Off freight transport where a ship carries wheeled cargo to and from a port.
MT - Million Metric Ton; Total transported cargo by weight. 
Ha - Hectare; A unit of square area equaling a two dimensional square with 100 metre sides. 
Liquid Bulk - Mass liquid commodities such as crude oil or LNG.
Dry Bulk - Mass ‘dry’ items such as ores, coal and grain.
Containers - Cargo transported via standardised container.
General Cargo - Individual items which are neither commodities nor shipped within containers such as 
large construction or manufacturing parts, for example a wind turbine blade.
Source: Department for Transport: Maritime and Shipping Statistics
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DOVER, UK
Description
The area of Dover has an extensive history of human inhabitation and since at least the Roman times 
the area has been prized for its maritime links.95 This is in large part due to circumstances of favourable 
geography; resting between the White Cliffs of Dover, the valley and estuary originally created by the River 
Dour made for a natural protected harbour. 
Meanwhile its position at the narrowest part of the English Channel means it has always been the focus of 
maritime activity relating to France and the European mainland. In 1606, King James I created the Dover 
Harbour Board by a Royal Charter, and the port continues to be operated by this statutory body. Dover has 
gradually grown in scale, playing key roles in both World Wars. 
After this the port has become further commercialised, with the advent of roll-on / roll-off methods in 
1965 quickly transforming the way the port operated. Even with the opening of the Channel Tunnel at 
nearby Folkestone in 1994 the port has continued to grow.
Operational Profile
Today, Dover’s 26.2 MT annual throughput is dominated by ro-ro traffic, with its cargo volume accounting 
for 99% of this total96. Dover is by far the busiest port in the UK both in terms of number of transiting 
heavy goods vehicles (2.6 million) and ro-ro cargo by tonnage. By volume of separate cargo units, Dover 
is as busy as the next three largest ro-ro ports combined. Even including other freight categories Dover 
accounts for 20.2% of all UK cargo units handled annually and 17% of all UK trade by value (£122bn)97. 
Of this cargo, over 99% originates from the EU. 
95  https://www.doverport.co.uk/about/history-and-development/ 
96  https://www.gov.uk/government/statistical-data-sets/port-and-domestic-waterborne-freight-statistics-port#port-level-statistics
97  https://www.doverport.co.uk/about/news/port-of-dover-announces-fifth-consecutive-record-y/13341/ 
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Dover is orientated around an ‘arrive and drive’98 model which is currently reliant on minimal customs 
checks. Each EU lorry arriving at the port only needs to stop to show their boarding information and 
passport; on average these checks take less than two minutes. The ports speed advantages in terms of 
sailing, disembarkation and embarkation times means that the kind of freight transported through Dover 
tends to be time critical items involved in just-in-time supply chains, including perishables such as food. For 
example one quarter of all of the UK’s bananas pass through Dover.99 
Dover Factsheet (2017)100
TOTAL FREIGHT
• 26.2 million metric tons
PORT AREA 
• 425 Ha (including water) 
FREIGHT MIX
• Liquid Bulk - 0 MT
• Dry Bulk - 0.02 MT
• Containers - 0.003 MT
• Ro-Ro -25.9 MT
• General Cargo - 0.3 MT
FREIGHT DISTRIBUTION
• UK - 0.024 MT
• EU - 25.6 MT
• Other - 0.24 MT
How will Brexit affect Dover?
Officials at the port have warned that Dover faces being heavily impacted negatively by any form of Brexit 
which does not allow Dover to mostly function as it currently does. Research done by Imperial College 
London’s Centre for Transport Studies and commissioned by the BBC has warned that possible tailbacks at 
Dover get progressively worse as checks take longer to undertake101. Utilising traffic simulations and data 
from various sources including the Port of Dover and Department for Transport, the research calculates 
that an additional two minutes of checks on each vehicle would triple the length of queues found currently 
found at peak times in the port to nearly 10 miles on the M20 and A20. Three minutes of checks would 
result in almost 20 miles worth of queues, while four minutes would lead to nearly 30 miles of traffic. 
Currently, checks of imports coming from outside the EU common market can typically take 5 to 45 
minutes per vehicle depending on cargo, with WTO countries often taking longer102. As such the potential 
for tens of miles of tailbacks is high. The port has stated that it does not have enough space on-site to 
undertake the number of customs controls which are likely to be needed. Even currently Dover does not 
perform checks on the 1% of non-EU cargo at the port itself. These controls are instead done six miles 
away at a stop on the M20 with space for 82 HGVs.103 While the port is investing in expanding through its 
Western Docks Revival project, this will not meaningfully increase capacity for checks due to limited space 
and given it was designed before the 2016 referendum.104 Due to the port’s position adjacent to the town 
of Dover and the White Cliffs, the port is unlikely to have much further space to expand its site. 
Since the completion of the EU common market in 1993 Dover has seen huge increases in freight while 
existing space for customs checks has been replaced. Before 1993 East Kent hosted 300 customs officers, 
of whom 125 were stationed at Dover; now East Kent only has 24105. To deal with customs paperwork 
there were also 185 customs clearance agents pre-1993, this has reduced to 17 today. Meanwhile 
the increases in freight volume and frequency mean that while in 1993 there were between 2m and 
2.5m clearance documentation entries; today that could result in over 25m entries between Dover and 
Eurotunnel. In January 2018 HMRC updated its systems for 3rd country trade paperwork to require entry 
of 84 separate data fields, an increase from 50 beforehand. This additional workload will also add to costs 
for UK businesses.
98  https://www.politico.eu/article/port-of-dover-struggles-to-avoid-a-brexit-cliff-edge/ 
99  https://www.lloydsloadinglist.com/freight-directory/adviceandinsight/Port-of-Dover-thinks-fresh-produce/298.htm#.W9fiSBr7RPM 
100  https://www.gov.uk/government/statistical-data-sets/port-and-domestic-waterborne-freight-statistics-port#port-level-statistics
101  https://www.imperial.ac.uk/news/186530/how-imperials-findings-post-brexit-borders-caught/ 
102  https://www.economist.com/britain/2017/04/06/to-see-how-trade-may-work-after-brexit-visit-dovers-docks 
103  http://www.asm.org.uk/media/96111/ifg_brexit_customs_web_0.pdf 
104  https://www.doverport.co.uk/DWDR 
105  https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/jun/20/port-of-dover-warning-regular-gridlock-congestion-hard-brexit-trade 
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Delays and Congestion 
The implications of large delays and tailbacks are multifaceted. Supply chains which operate through Dover 
utilise the port because they are often highly time critical. This includes manufacturing parts using just-
in-time supply chains where delays in the logistics chain could result in lower manufacturing output. For 
example BMW has announced that its Mini factory at Cowley in Oxford will have maintenance brought 
forward so that it coincides with the UK’s exit from the EU, fearing that supply chains may not function 
properly in the weeks afterwards106. 
Perishable items such as food are likely to suffer from similar potential problems. Operation Stack in 
2015 was estimated to have resulted in the loss of £21m worth of perishable items carried by hauliers107. 
A survey done by the Port of Dover with the British Chambers of Commerce reported that 36% of all 
trading businesses rely on just-in-time delivery methods, with 33% of all businesses likely to affected by 
new customs procedures having not yet prepared for it108. On the exporting side, of Dover’s two main 
connecting ports; Calais and Dunkirk, only Dunkirk currently has an inspection post capable of managing 
food from third countries109. Given such infrastructure could take a significant amount of time it could 
hinder or stop UK exports of food via Calais. 
Kent Trading Standards and the UK Border Force 
Operations undertaken by Kent Trading Standards and the UK Border Force (UKBF) are also likely to be 
affected by the changing situation at Dover.110 If the UKBF intercept a cargo and suspect it to be a potential 
risk then Trading Standards have 72 hours to determine if they comply with relevant (currently EU) 
legislation and regulations or not. Trading Standards can then choose to allow the cargo to pass or declare 
it non-compliant. Goods which do not meet standards are declared non-complaint and can then be either 
made complaint, re-exported or destroyed, among other possibilities. 
Currently UKBF inspects 100,000 goods a year at Dover and Eurotunnel; in the absence of an arrangement 
to the contrary 2m vehicles passing into the UK could become subject to checks. As with other parts of 
the port there is currently little capacity to undertake controls on this scale in terms of both infrastructure 
and in terms of personnel, especially for Kent Trading Standards. Additionally the two agencies work 
together based on the EU RAMS system; without a UK alternative goods can no longer be held at cost 
to the importer, but rather to UBKF and Trading Standards themselves. Previous situations where this has 
happened has caused considerable cost to Kent Trading Standards. 
Brexit Preparations 
A variety of preparations are being undertaken to mitigate the potential effects. Primarily among this 
is attempts to control the probable traffic problems that will be created as a result of controls being 
imposed. Through the Kent Resilience Forum, Operation Fennel111 has been established which would 
consecutively include Dover TAP (traffic management at Dover), Operation Brock (using the M20 as 
contraflow on one carriageway and HGV parking on the other), Operation Stack (utilising the M20 as 
HGV parking from junction 8 up to junction 11 if necessary), and Manston Airport Operation Stack (as 
HGV parking). 
Due to a judicial review, the UK government withdrew its proposal to construct a 4000 space lorry 
park at junction 11 of the M20 in November 2017112, no public information has been released 
regarding any investigation into alternatives. The M26 has also been mooted should further capacity be 
needed; Highways England has been undertaking work to install gates on the central reservation as a 
contingency113. 
106  https://www.theguardian.com/business/2018/sep/18/bmw-shut-mini-plant-brexit-no-deal 
107  https://www.kentonline.co.uk/maidstone/news/haulage-group-calls-for-compensation-41958/ 
108  https://www.britishchambers.org.uk/news/2018/04/bcc-business-cant-rely-on-just-in-time-brexit-preparation 
109  https://www.dover.gov.uk/Corporate-Information/Brexit/FINAL-DDC-Brexit-Impact-Report-Update-October-2018-final.pdf
110  https://democracy.kent.gov.uk/documents/s85283/ImportControlsPostBrexitandtheirImpactonKent.pdf 
111  https://www.dover.gov.uk/Corporate-Information/Brexit/FINAL-DDC-Brexit-Impact-Report-Update-October-2018-final.pdf
112  https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-sussex-42002776 
113  https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-45827197 
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While this plan (excluding the M26) adds capacity for up to around 10,500 HGVs, it imposes considerable 
costs and questions remain as to its possible efficacy. Operation Stack alone was estimated to cost the Kent 
economy £1.4m a day when it last occurred and while cost estimates of £250m a day to the UK economy 
as a whole are questionable114, it is clear significant cost is imposed by Stack. 
While these contingencies are designed to act as a buffer so that an overflow can be controlled for a 
period of time, they cannot solve any chronic problems because they do not address throughput at ports 
such as Dover; around 16,000 HGV’s pass through Dover and Eurotunnel each day115. Operation Fennel 
projects can only somewhat mitigate problems in supply chain problems the traffic backload could create, 
nor the environmental impact. With 34 government agencies operating at Dover capable of stopping 
traffic116, there also remains risks in ensuring effective coordination.
Other concerns have also be raised regarding Operation Brock. While Brock is intended to be ready 
before March 2019 the National Audit Office noted that there was significant risk it might not be ready in 
time, with little room for delay117. Dover District Council has also reported that it requested that Brock not 
impede the operation of businesses in the Dover district itself, this included preventing Dover businesses 
needing to queue at Maidstone to enter the port. Dover District Council was told that this cannot be 
achieved118. 
Customs Systems 
On a UK-wide basis the government is due to replace its current CHIEF customs declaration system with a 
new IT system. This system was planned before the 2016 referendum and as such was designed to deliver 
60 million customs checks a year, the system is now expected to have to handle over 255 million119. The 
new system is intended to be running before the UK leaves the EU, although the National Audit Office has 
warned that there remains large risks should it not be ready120. Dover itself has also been attempting to 
encouraging plans whereby lorry traffic can be pre-notified to customs so that vehicles do not have to stop 
at the port itself121. Included within this is the requirement that any required checks are done away from 
the port as well. However this would require a large spread of infrastructure which could take a significant 
amount of time, neither is there evidence that this kind of work is being undertaken. 
One suggestion has been to ‘wave through’ inbound traffic at Dover (and other ports) in the event of a 
no-deal Brexit so as to avoid having to conduct checks. This however could very quickly lead to various 
types of abuse if no systemised checks are taking place, with little ability to maintain security at the border. 
In such a situation the EU is also likely to impose checks regardless of this because the UK has become a 
third country with the legal obligations this creates for both sides, something that would still create very 
similar traffic issues. It is also possible that such a move is illegal under WTO trading rules122. 
Another suggestion has been for goods to be diverted away from Dover to other ports such as Ramsgate, 
Sheppey and other ports such as London and Felixstowe. While encouraging this diversion may bring some 
slight relief, there is little evidence that alternative ports have enough spare capacity to take meaningful 
amounts of goods away from Dover due to Dover’s sheer size. Many of these alternative ports are also 
primarily or solely container based rather than roll-on / roll-off. These ports generally cannot provide the 
speed or frequency required for the time-critical goods such as food or manufacturing parts that pass 
through Dover. Diversion would also require some degree of decision-making, with a government or 
market level of diversion both likely to incur economic loss. The Port of Dover has estimated that just this 
diversion alone could cost £2.5bn due to lost efficiency123. 
114  https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmtrans/65/6506.htm 
115  https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/jul/17/dover-calais-facing-economic-catastrophe-due-to-brexit 
116  https://www.economist.com/britain/2017/04/06/to-see-how-trade-may-work-after-brexit-visit-dovers-docks
117  https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Implementing-the-UKs-Exit-from-the-European-Union-Summary.pdf 
118  https://www.dover.gov.uk/Corporate-Information/Brexit/FINAL-DDC-Brexit-Impact-Report-Update-October-2018-final.pdf
119  https://www.economist.com/britain/2017/04/06/to-see-how-trade-may-work-after-brexit-visit-dovers-docks
120  https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/The-Customs-Declaration-Service-a-progress-update.pdf 
121  https://www.kentonline.co.uk/kent/news/the-only-way-is-dover-190666/ 
122  http://www.politics.co.uk/comment-analysis/2018/08/24/demolishing-peter-lilley-s-wto-brexit-nonsense 
123  https://www.kentonline.co.uk/kent/news/the-only-way-is-dover-190666/ 
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RAMSGATE, UK
Description
First mentioned within the Kent Hundred Rolls in 1274124 as a small coastal fishing hamlet, Ramsgate 
became part of the Confederation of Cinque Ports in 1483 under the ‘limb’ of Sandwich. Construction of 
a harbour in Ramsgate began in 1749 and was finished in 1850, with Ramsgate holding the distinction 
of being the only Royal Harbour in the UK. During the Napoleonic wars Ramsgate grew in importance 
due to its geographical proximity to mainland Europe. This was further reinforced during the course of 
both World Wars, with Ramsgate the second most important port during the course of the evacuation 
of Dunkirk in Operation Dynamo. Today the commercial port of Ramsgate is operated by Thanet District 
Council, making it among one of the 26 municipal ports across England and Wales125. 
Operational Profile
Ramsgate is a small-scale port focusing on ro-ro traffic, with three ferry berths giving a stated capacity of 
1.1 million units a year (2016). Along with this is space for 550 lorries on site, including the capability to 
handle unaccompanied loads of cargo. The port advertises that it has similar road distances between it and 
the M25 as the Port of Dover does, while also avoiding the M20 and associated impacts that Operation 
Stack has had on it126. The port also plays a role in hosting businesses which collectively service 320 nearby 
offshore wind turbines. 
Despite these publicised advantages, Ramsgate has struggled to maintain steady cargo throughput and 
arrangements with ferry and shipping businesses. While in 2010 the port handled 1.7 MT of cargo, this 
had dropped precipitously to just 59 thousand tons (0.059 MT) by 2017, which itself is an increase from a 
low of 0.014 MT in 2014.127 
124  https://www.ramsgatetown.org/history 
125  http://www.portoframsgate.co.uk/royal-harbour-marina/historic-ramsgate/ 
126  http://www.portoframsgate.co.uk/media/3435071/Discover-the-Port-of-Ramsgate-6-page-article.pdf 
127  https://www.gov.uk/government/statistical-data-sets/port-and-domestic-waterborne-freight-statistics-port#port-level-statistics
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One of key causes of this was the collapse of the TransEuropa ferry service to Ostend in 2013, which 
was the last time ferries carrying lorries operated from Ramsgate128. While new services have since been 
suggested, they have failed to materialise. This includes a new Ramsgate-Ostend service which was due to 
begin in March 2018129. Since 2010, the port has incurred losses of approximately £20 million, although 
the council has said that these numbers included some losses from other council services which interact 
with the port130. 
A £6 million infrastructure plan to expand the port in 2016 also failed to come to fruition when central 
government rejected a bid for £4 million towards this plan, the rest was intended to come from Thanet 
District Council itself131. The plan involved improving and upgrading the port’s ro-ro and bulk cargo 
handling capacity. While Ramsgate signed a deal with car shipment company GEFCO in January 2016, 
this agreement lapsed after 12 months. Since then Ramsgate has only been used by the company on an 
ad-hoc basis when other ports such as Sheppey and Felixstowe are at maximum capacity132. In January the 
port itself received planning permission for some of its ferry loading areas to be used as parking for up to 
90 lorries. 
Ramsgate Factsheet133
TOTAL FREIGHT (2017)
• 0.059 MT
PORT AREA
• 13 Ha
FREIGHT MIX
• Liquid Bulk - 0 MT
• Dry Bulk - 0.057 MT
• Containers - 0 MT
• Ro-Ro — 0.001 MT
• General Cargo - 0.001 MT
FREIGHT DISTRIBUTION
• UK - 0.055 MT
• EU - 0.004 MT
How will Brexit affect Ramsgate?
Due to Ramsgate’s currently low levels of freight throughput, particularly in comparison to its theoretical 
capacity, Brexit does not necessarily create issues in Ramsgate that are seen in other ports. While increased 
checks will undoubtably increase workload above current levels, because Ramsgate does not maintain a 
meaningful flow of freight traffic any added delays within the port are unlikely to have knock-on effects 
overall.
The issue of spare capacity has led to the suggestion that Ramsgate could gain business if transporting 
cargo through Dover becomes more difficult. Thanet District Council itself has suggested that the port 
could play a part in ensuring the UK’s logistical resilience after Brexit134. Although it has also stated it is 
open to selling the port and / or turning it into a residential marina.135 This potential was noted recently in 
a Kent County Council report regarding preparedness which suggested that Ramsgate could help ensure 
the continuity of cross-channel ro-ro freight traffic by taking a larger share if needed136. In the event of this 
happening the KCC report also proposes further infrastructure investment to further allow Ramsgate to 
develop. 
The suggestion for further infrastructure investment is certainly compelling by helping to open up spare 
capacity within Kent and benefiting the port itself, on a strategic level it is unlikely to bring major relief to 
Kent as a whole. Taking Ramsgate’s 2010 throughput of 1.7 MT as an estimation of the ports capacity 
(assuming no depreciation), this amounts to around just 6.6% of the Port of Dover’s own throughput. This 
also assumes that Ramsgate can fully operate at this amount under a Brexit scenario involving full customs 
checks, including the additional surrounding road traffic that operating the port at a high tempo would 
create. 
128  https://theisleofthanetnews.com/2018/06/18/ramsgate-port-has-made-losses-of-20million-over-eight-years/ 
129  https://theisleofthanetnews.com/2018/04/14/thanet-council-confirms-talks-with-ostend-ramsgate-ferry-operator-hopeful/ 
130  https://theisleofthanetnews.com/2018/06/18/ramsgate-port-has-made-losses-of-20million-over-eight-years/ 
131  https://theisleofthanetnews.com/2018/06/18/ramsgate-port-has-made-losses-of-20million-over-eight-years/ 
132  https://theisleofthanetnews.com/2018/07/21/car-import-deliveries-expected-to-take-place-at-ramsgate-port/ 
133  https://www.gov.uk/government/statistical-data-sets/port-and-domestic-waterborne-freight-statistics-port#port-level-statistics 
134  https://www.kentlive.news/news/kent-news/fortunes-port-ramsgate-could-turned-1999467 
135  https://www.kentlive.news/news/kent-news/thanet-district-council-leader-refuses-2141866 
136  https://democracy.kent.gov.uk/documents/s85242/Brexit%20-%20KCC%20Position%20Paper.pdf 
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While Ramsgate is certainly directly free from Stack / Brock operations on the M20, this does not 
necessarily free the port from being affected by knock-on disruption throughout Kent. 
Likewise, potential lorry parking on the M26137 is likely to produce similar problems, especially in regards 
to freight heading into the UK via the south of London. Closer to Ramsgate the Department for Transport 
has undertaken preparations to utilise the space at Manston Airport for lorry parking, something also 
suggested as a contingency by KCC. Any extensive use of this area for this purpose is likely to bring 
considerable traffic into the area, in particular on the A299 which the port connects to. Lorries directed to 
Manston for parking could easily prevent smooth flows of cargo into and out of the port.138 
Brexit Preparations
Apart from suggestions regarding the future of the port, the port is currently undertaking little to no 
physical preparations. However it must be noted that this is not necessarily surprising given Ramsgate’s 
current throughput which does not require extensive preparations. Without any concrete decisions 
regarding the port’s actual post-Brexit future there is arguably a limited amount that the port is capable 
of doing, although this is certainly something being considered as part of Kent and central government 
planning.
137  https://www.kentonline.co.uk/kent/news/government-urged-to-abandon-m26-lorry-park-plan-192133/ 
138  https://www.dover.gov.uk/Corporate-Information/Brexit/FINAL-DDC-Brexit-Impact-Report-Update-October-2018-final.pdf
60
HOLYHEAD, UK
Description
Positioned on the tip of Holy Island, which is now connected by a causeway to the larger island of 
Anglesey, Holyhead and its region has a long history as a important strategic position within Wales139. 
A Roman fort built on Holy island to secure the area in the first century AD is emblematic of the area’s 
importance, something further enhanced by its proximity to Ireland. With the advent of a connecting 
road and new harbour facilities in the 1800s, Holyhead became the main port of Anglesey, surpassing the 
nearby port at Beaumaris. Today Holyhead is primarily a ferry port, and is owned and operated by Stena 
Line140.
Operational Profile
Holyhead as a port is dominated by the use of ro-ro freight carried through Holyhead’s ferry terminals. Of 
Holyhead’s 5.2 MT throughput, over 99% is loaded using ro-ro methods. Because of Holyhead’s position 
the port operates the fastest ferry route across the Irish Sea, with a ferry journey to Dublin taking just over 
three hours.141 This proximity has made Holyhead the second busiest ro-ro port in the UK after Dover by 
number of lorries; approximately 430,000 passed through Holyhead in 2016142. Holyhead holds a key role 
in connecting the UK to Ireland; around 85% of Ireland’s trade with the EU28 goes via the UK, of this 
around 40% is freight using the UK as route to mainland Europe.143
Almost all of Holyhead’s outgoing freight is destined for Ireland, primarily through the Port of Dublin. Of 
Holyhead’s incoming freight, approximately two thirds originates in the Republic of Ireland, while one third 
comes from Northern Ireland. This Northern Irish freight is routed this way because it is often faster to 
drive from Northern Ireland and offload at Dublin than using a route such as Belfast to Liverpool, a route 
which takes eight hours144. 
139  http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/waleshistory/2011/06/opening_of_holyhead_harbour_1880.html 
140  http://holyheadport.co.uk/about-holyhead-port/what-we-do-at-holyhead-port 
141  https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-45589275 
142  https://www.irishtimes.com/news/ireland/irish-news/holyhead-will-be-one-of-the-biggest-losers-from-brexit-1.3343977 
143  https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-44657460 
144  https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-45589275 
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Holyhead Factsheet (2017)145
TOTAL FREIGHT
• 5.2 MT
PORT AREA
• 260 Ha (harbour area)
FREIGHT MIX
• Liquid Bulk - 0.02 million 
metric tons
• Dry Bulk - 0 million metric 
tons
• Containers - 0 million 
metric tons
• Ro-Ro — 5.2 million metric 
tons
• General Cargo - 0 million 
metric tons
FREIGHT DISTRIBUTION
• UK - 0.008 MT
• EU - 5.2 MT
How will Brexit affect Holyhead?
Due to Holyhead’s role as a ro-ro port connected almost entirely to the Republic of Ireland, the port faces 
considerable Brexit challenges. For example the ferries which dock within 25 minutes of each other at the 
port unload three miles worth of lorries (400 to 500) as they disembark146, even short customs checks 
is likely to introduce delays with Holyhead having limited space to park lorries or conduct the checks 
themselves. Even under existing arrangements large traffic problems have arisen when weather has 
prevented ferries from sailing, similar problems have also occurred when there has been disruption to the 
bridge between Anglesey and the mainland.147 With Holyhead’s role as the fastest freight connection to 
Ireland, large quantities of perishable goods such as food pass through the port. These kinds of cargoes 
are more likely to require enhanced checks (such as sanitary and phytosanitary) and because they are time-
critical are more likely to affected by delays.
Since the completion of the EU Single Market in 1993, trade volumes between Holyhead and Ireland 
have grown 694%.148 This makes accommodating customs controls particularly difficult as Holyhead faces 
having less space for checks but with much more checks to undertake with and little geographical space to 
expand. Operator Stena Line warned when giving evidence to the Welsh Assembly that each of the large 
ferries which Holyhead uses carry more traffic than the port is capable of dealing with at once.149 The same 
Welsh Assembly report noted that Holyhead’s functioning is predicated on frictionless trade.150 
Irish and EU plans to bypass the UK151 to secure their own separate logistics routes are also likely to 
negatively affect trade volumes at Holyhead in the longer term. The port has also stated that it could lose 
out to more northerly British ports connected to Northern Ireland. This is based on Holyhead’s experience 
pre-1993 where freight carriers preferred to utilise the UK-Ireland land border because customs checks 
were considered less onerous than ones done a sea-ports. This was due to the larger capacity of the wider 
land-border and the focus on security leading to faster checks152. 
Brexit Preparations 
While the very limited space at Holyhead is a limiting factor, the port has continued to undertake 
investments, with operator Irish Ferries spending €144 million on a new larger capacity ship153. The port 
has also undertaken coordination and fact-finding missions with HMRC’s Brexit teams, and has asked the 
Welsh government for further support and co-operation. Stena Line has stated that stronger preparations 
would require more certainty in regards to the Brexit deal the UK government is seeking to reach, even as 
March 2019 is getting ever closer. 
145  https://www.gov.uk/government/statistical-data-sets/port-and-domestic-waterborne-freight-statistics-port#port-level-statistics
146  https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-45589275 
147  https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/aug/16/welsh-port-fears-chaos-of-uk-leaving-customs-union-holyhead-ireland-brexit 
148  http://senedd.assembly.wales/documents/s63674/04POR%20Irish%20Ferries.pdf 
149  http://www.assembly.wales/laid%20documents/cr-ld11158/cr-ld11158-e.pdf 
150  http://www.assembly.wales/laid%20documents/cr-ld11158/cr-ld11158-e.pdf 
151  https://www.politico.eu/article/brexit-french-ireland-ports-cut-out-of-eu-trade-route-after-brexit/ 
152  http://senedd.assembly.wales/documents/s63674/04POR%20Irish%20Ferries.pdf 
153  http://senedd.assembly.wales/documents/s63674/04POR%20Irish%20Ferries.pdf 
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Irish Customs have also raised the possibility of a post-Brexit scheme whereby goods destined for Ireland 
from the EU could pass through the UK154 (primarily through Dover and Holyhead) so long as they were 
kept sealed. This scheme however is yet to be mentioned by the EU as a whole, and would need approval 
on an EU level. It would also require a certification system for businesses. On a UK level HMRC has stated 
that it is prepared to recruit thousands of additional customs officers, although the timetables for this 
recruitment and how many would be sent to ports (including Holyhead) is unclear.155
154  https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/sep/06/ireland-hopes-side-deal-with-eu-could-allow-it-friction-free-trade-across-border 
155  https://www.euronews.com/2018/02/22/brexit-how-do-eu-countries-customs-plans-compare-with-the-uk- 
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CALAIS, FRANCE156
How will Brexit affect Calais?
As a port whose throughput is dominated by ro-ro traffic, Calais faces very similar challenges to its 
counterpart Dover across the channel. The high frequency cargo flows that Calais is designed for mean 
that it has little to no current infrastructure for dealing with the various checks that could be required 
beyond the relatively low number that are currently undertaken. 
As with Dover, the port has warned that a change from the minimal time taken now to checks taking 
just two minutes or more could result in tens of miles of queues out of the port.157 The French National 
Federation of Road Transport linked two minute checks to 16 mile tailbacks around major French ports, 
including Calais. Officials at Calais have noted that such situations would be reminiscent of July 2015 
where disruption caused by immigrants and striking port workers resulted in 30 mile queues going east 
from Calais to Dunkirk, 25 mile southerly queues to Saint-Omer and 20 mile westerly queues towards 
Boulogne. This also created queues in Dover and required the activation of Operation Stack even though 
the port of Dover itself remained functional. 
As such, there are dangers that even if either Calais or Dover can successfully mitigate disruption they 
could still be damaged by the other port not doing the same. As such preventing these problems requires 
easing problems at both (including other major entry points such as Eurotunnel and Dunkirk). For example 
Calais currently has no inspection area capable of performing checks on 3rd country food products as it 
has had no previous need to do so158. 
156 N.B data regarding the Port of Calais was not verifiable such that it could be included, hence this profile focuses on known effects and   
 preparations.
157 https://www.portstrategy.com/news101/world/europe/brexit-could-cause-tailbacks-and-food-shortages 
158 https://www.dover.gov.uk/Corporate-Information/Brexit/FINAL-DDC-Brexit-Impact-Report-Update-October-2018-final.pdf 
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Jean-Paul Mulot, Hauts-de-France’s permanent representative to the UK has cautioned that these new food 
controls could lead to lorries carrying food blocking other lorries from entering the port159. 
Because most of the food entering Calais are perishable, any delays will reduce quality or prevent supply 
entirely, damaging the effective functioning of parts of the UK’s food supply chain. The BBC recently 
reported that there could be a 75-80% drop in traffic going through the Calais-Dover route in the event of 
a no-deal Brexit160.
Brexit Preparations 
Calais is undergoing an ambitious expansion plan which began in 2015 and is due to finish in 2021. 
€662.3m is planned to be spent primarily on increasing capacity and improving efficiency, including more 
berths for larger ferries161 and a much larger port basin. However this upgrade plan was designed before 
Brexit and therefore the expansion is based on different assumptions than any upgrade based in view of 
Brexit, including an organic 40% growth in cross-channel traffic by 2030. These assumptions mean the 
Calais’ expansion does not significantly increase the ports ratio of inspection capacity to cargo throughput. 
Despite this, the port has been attempting to work towards increasing capacity alongside this expansion, 
with the port recently purchasing 17 Ha of additional land for inspection posts and warehousing162, 
including refrigerated spaces for food cargo. The city of Calais itself has also announced plans to build its 
own 40 Ha area for similar purposes on the outskirts of the city between the port and the Eurotunnel163. 
The Hauts-de-France region has also said that it has the option of preparing another area at the cost of 
around €100million164 but no construction has been yet been started and it is unclear how this project 
would be funded. Building facilities at the site, from start to finish, could also take at least 18 months, so 
the area would only be ready if a transition period was agreed in a Brexit deal. The port also intends to 
test a new “Fastpass” virtual queuing system165 where hauliers can pre-confirm their passport and cargo 
information so that their checks at the port can be reduced.
The French government has also been making preparations, including the hiring of 700 additional customs 
officials166, with a portion of these likely to be assigned to Calais. Hauts-de-France estimates that it needs 
250 additional border agents, 195 customs officials in the region and 250 sanitary agents across the 
region as a whole. Concerns have been reported that recruiting large numbers of veterinarians for livestock 
controls will be impeded by an ongoing shortage in vets across the EU167. Legislation is also being fast-
tracked through the French parliament to ensure the legal basis for French no-deal planning168.
While there have been reports the French government could intentionally slow flows of freight passing 
through the port169, officials have dismissed this suggestion and there is little evidence that France is 
intending to create any more controls and checks than is legal and necessary. Although it should be noted 
that predictions of disruption are already predicated on the requirements of necessary checks rather than 
intentional delays to freight. 
159 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/oct/17/france-says-britons-could-need-visa-to-visit-after-no-deal-brexit 
160  https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-45955500 
161  https://www.portboulognecalais.fr/en/calais-port-2015-2 
162  https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/jul/17/dover-calais-facing-economic-catastrophe-due-to-brexit 
163  https://www.thelocal.fr/20181026/calais-prepares-to-fork-out-20-million-to-cover-brexit-costs 
164  https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-britain-eu-france/hurry-up-calais-region-urges-eu-uk-leaders-as-no-deal-brexit-looms-idUSKCN1LM2F1 
165  https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/jul/17/dover-calais-facing-economic-catastrophe-due-to-brexit 
166  https://www.politico.eu/article/france-prepares-for-no-deal-brexit-cliff-edge-legislation/ 
167  https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-britain-eu-france/hurry-up-calais-region-urges-eu-uk-leaders-as-no-deal-brexit-looms-idUSKCN1LM2F1
168  http://www.senat.fr/leg/pjl18-009.html 
169  https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-45990243 
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DUNKIRK, FRANCE
Description
Beginning in the 11th century as a fishing port, Dunkirk eventually became an important commercial hub, 
with Dunkirk declared a free port from the time of Louis XIV to the French revolution170. With the eventual 
arrival of the railway in 1848, the port became connected to industrial activity going on throughout France 
and it’s traffic rapidly increased. Over time the port increased in size, although it suffered extensive damage 
in both World Wars. By the 1950s the port underwent growth in both its traffic and facilities. Today the 
port is one of the three major ports in the Hauts-de-France region and is under 20 miles from the France-
Belgium border along with Calais and the fishing port of Boulogne-sur-Mer with Dunkirk now the third 
largest cargo port in France as a whole. Since 2008 the port has been operated by “Grand Port Maritime 
de Dunkerque” (Dunkirk Major Sea Port), which acts as Dunkirk’s port authority.
Operational Profile
While Dunkirk is France’s third largest port, it is the second largest French port on France’s northern 
coast, after Calais. Dunkirk’s cargo mixture is dominated by heavy bulk cargos (29.7 MT) and ro-ro traffic 
(16.2 MT)171. This emphasis on heavy cargo gives Dunkirk a strong industrial focus. For example steel 
manufacturer ArcelorMittal operates a liquid steel site within the port fed by ore from Dunkirk itself, with 
6.8MT produced in 2017172. Because of this traffic Dunkirk is France’s largest single point of entry for ore 
and coal imports173. The rail network which facilitates this also makes Dunkirk France’s busiest rail port, 
with 11% of total French rail freight transported by Dunkirk. While Dunkirk’s total container traffic is 
relatively low (3.2 MT), Dunkirk maintains a niche as France’s largest import location for containerised fruit, 
which typically is transported frozen within refrigerated containers. 
170  http://www.dunkerque-port.fr/en/dunkirk-port/history-dunkirk-port-origins.html 
171  http://www.dunkerque-port.fr/en/dunkirk-port/online-documentation/activity-report.html 
172  https://www.metalbulletin.com/Article/3770667/ArcelorMittal-Dunkirk-site-setto-achieve-record-high-liquid-steel-output-in-2017.html 
173  http://www.dunkerque-port.fr/en/press/press-kit.html 
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Around one third (16.7 MT) of all of Dunkirk’s traffic is connected to that of the UK174, with these flows 
overwhelmingly concentrated within Dunkirk’s ro-ro capacity. This is due in large part to a combination of 
Dunkirk’s geographical proximity to the UK, requiring just a two hour ferry journey, as well as the general 
ease of use of ro-ro itself; particularly given that Dover is the closest major UK sea-entry point.
Currently Dunkirk is also at the tail-end of a four-year €250 million expansion project which began in 
2014175. In 2015 a new border post for conducting plant and animal controls was built which increased 
Dunkirk’s capacity for checks from 1000 to 5000 per year176. A new car terminal and logistics warehouse 
were also opened in 2016177. This year the port also opened a new secure parking site with the capacity for 
225 heavy goods vehicles, along with improved fencing and surveillance at the port entrance178. Dunkirk 
is also working on building road transit lanes within and into the port which are intended to segment 
container and ferry traffic to improve traffic flow. Additionally Dunkirk has been working with the other 
Hauts-de-France ports (including Calais) and French customs to implement a Cargo Community System 
which is intended to share shipment information between them179. 
Dunkirk Factsheet (2017)180
TOTAL FREIGHT
• 50.2 MT
PORT AREA
• 7000 Ha, 
including wider 
port territory and 
industrial space. 
FREIGHT MIX
• Liquid Bulk - 5.1 
MT
• Dry Bulk - 24.6 
MT
• Containers - 3.2 
MT
• Ro-Ro — 16.2 MT
• General Cargo - 
1.2 MT
FREIGHT 
DISTRIBUTION (DRY 
BULK ONLY)
• Europe - 2.3 MT
• North America - 
5.5 MT
• Russia - 2.2 MT
• Brazil - 5.5 MT
• Mauritania - 0.2 
MT
• South Africa - 0.2 
MT
• Australia - 1.6 MT
UK SPECIFIC FREIGHT
• Approx 1/3, 33% 
- 16.7 MT
How will Brexit affect Dunkirk?
As with the other channel ports, Dunkirk faces considerable problems in attempting to avoid traffic and 
disruption issues arising from undertaking customs controls on ro-ro traffic, which currently requires little 
to no controls. One leaked study by the French government181 estimated that 970,000 separate lots of 
cargo per year across Dunkirk and Calais would need to become subject to some form of checks such 
as phytosanitary and sanitary controls, as well as VAT and other assorted checks. For example UK car 
manufacturers also utilise steel produced in Dunkirk182, with such additional checks likely to make this less 
attractive on both sides. The study also warns that most of the French businesses which will be affected 
have little current knowledge of customs procedures or the kinds of additional paperwork which will be 
required.
With warnings that the Port of Calais may face tens of miles of queues due to the imposition of controls, 
there is however the possibility for gains if businesses choose to utilise Dunkirk instead. To some extent this 
was seen in 2015 when the Port at Calais was temporarily closed, with diversion to other ports boosting 
Dunkirk. However, when this is applied to Brexit, gains for Dunkirk are harder to envision. 
174 https://www.la-croix.com/Economie/Monde/Brexit-port-Dunkerque-veut-garder-avantage-2018-09-27-1200972054 
175 http://www.asm.org.uk/media/96111/ifg_brexit_customs_web_0.pdf 
176 http://www.dunkerque-port.fr/en/press/news/2015-10-08-port-of-dunkirk-inauguration-of-new-border-inspection-post-en-40946.html 
177 http://www.dunkerque-port.fr/en/press/news/2016-03-16-inauguration-of-new-channel-terminal-in-the-port-of-dunkirk-en-43582.html 
178 http://www.dunkerque-port.fr/en/press/news/2018-10-21-new-secure-parking-lot-for-heavy-goods-vehicles-starts-service-at-dunkerque-port- 
 ferry-terminal-en-56845.html
179 https://www.hellenicshippingnews.com/norlink-ports-dunkirk-annual-review-and-challenges-lying-ahead/ 
180 http://www.dunkerque-port.fr/en/dunkirk-port/online-documentation/activity-report.html 
181 https://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2018/09/29/hard-brexit-le-prefet-des-hauts-de-france-tire-le-signal-d-alarme_5362083_823448.  
 html? 
182 https://www.ft.com/content/cd937756-ea52-11e7-bd17-521324c81e23 
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This is because Dunkirk will still also have to impose checks and the delays they create; even short time 
penalties will cause flow problems in the port just as much as in other places. 
This would also not solve or relieve any potential traffic bottlenecks on the UK side as Calais traffic 
distributed to Dunkirk will still utilise the Port of Dover as its UK point of entry. While Dunkirk has been 
judged to be more capable of handling disruption than Calais, both French ports could lose out to Belgian 
and Dutch ports such as Zeebrugge and Rotterdam which are generally considered better prepared both 
systemically and in terms of infrastructure.
This observation has led to initial European Commission proposals bypassing the UK by investing in EU-
Irish sea freight links also bypassing French ports such as Calais, Dunkirk, Roscoff and Cherbourg. Instead 
the Commission proposal has suggested focusing on Zeebrugge, Rotterdam and Antwerp instead183. If this 
were to go ahead it would reduce the amount of extra trade that Dunkirk might get from increased direct 
trade with Ireland. However given the French government has threatened to veto such a proposal184, in all 
likelihood French ports such as Dunkirk may be included in this plan in the end. Apart from the potential 
gains in trade it would allow the port to bid for EU funding apportioned to the project, although again 
these gains are likely to only somewhat mitigate the overall disruption made. 
Brexit Preparations 
Part of the reason as to why Dunkirk is considered better prepared than Calais is due to its pre-existing 
experience with handling non-EU cargo through its container and bulk operations, which already 
comprises a not-insignificant portion of Dunkirk’s total throughput185. This has meant that Dunkirk has 
retained some expertise and infrastructure on-site which it otherwise would have lost. 
A French government report has warned that it could take 18 to 24 months to more fully develop and 
create the infrastructure required for the depth and frequency of the necessary checks186. In preparation 
the French government itself has announced it is hiring 700 additional customs officials, of which around 
200 are expected to be placed at Dunkirk. French Prime Minister Edouard Philippe also announced on 
October 11 that he would appoint a governmental coordinator to manage the issues that Brexit raises for 
its ports and channel territories187. 
While the port is likely to remain involved with a large amount of trade with the UK, Dunkirk has also been 
attempting to diversify away from UK cargo. Since the completion of its LNG terminal in 2016 Dunkirk 
has seen increasing non-EU liquid bulk traffic. The transport of gas products, mainly LNG, increased by 
230% from 2016 to 2017. The port is also developing infrastructure to fuel new ships running on LNG188. 
The port is also developing infrastructure to fuel new ships running on LNG194 and trying to leverage its 
expertise in containerised fruit to encourage further imports, mainly from Latin America.
183 https://www.politico.eu/article/brexit-french-ireland-ports-cut-out-of-eu-trade-route-after-brexit
184 https://uk.reuters.com/article/us-britain-eu-france-trade/france-fumes-at-proposed-post-brexit-eu-sea-trade-links-idUKKBN1KW0KB
185 https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-britain-eu-france/france-ramps-up-border-controls-in-preparation-for-no-deal-brexit-idUKKCN1MC0TS 
186 https://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2018/09/29/hard-brexit-le-prefet-des-hauts-de-france-tire-le-signal-d-alarme_5362083_823448.  
 html?
187 https://kozpost.com/blog/brexit-philippe-appoints-a-coordinator-in-response-to-concerns-of-french-ports/11249/
188 https://www.containerst.com/news/view,dunkirk-port-getting-ready-for-brexit_50479.htm 
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ROTTERDAM, THE NETHERLANDS
Description
With a history stretching back to the 13th Century189, the Port of Rotterdam has been a near constant 
presence on the Northern European coast. In 1938 Rotterdam surpassed London as Europe’s largest 
port and in 1962 overtook New York to become the largest port in the world. While it lost this crown 
in 2004 to the Port of Shanghai, Rotterdam remains the largest in Europe and is the only deep-sea port 
capable of operating with all types of ship 24 hours a day between Le-Havre and Hamburg190. Rotterdam 
has operated container shipping since 1966191 and today it comprises a major portion of Rotterdam’s 
total operations. The port is run by the Port of Rotterdam Authority which is joint owned between the 
municipality of Rotterdam itself and the Dutch government. 
Operational Profile
Rotterdam performs an outside role in terms of EU port capacity, conveying over 460 million tons (MT) of 
cargo each year192. This dwarfs the individual capacity of any other EU port; with Rotterdam approximately 
the same size as the next three largest ports (Antwerp, Hamburg and Amsterdam) combined193. The 
majority of cargo that passes through Rotterdam is Bulk cargo in the form of liquid or dry bulk. As of 2017 
45.8% of Rotterdam’s total throughput by mass consists of liquid bulk, with dry bulk making up another 
17.2% and container shipping constituting 30.5%194. The remaining 6.5% is composed of so-called break 
bulk / general cargo. Of this 6.5% (30.3 MT), 23.8 MT is Roll-off/Roll-on freight with the small remainder 
listed by Rotterdam as other general cargo.
189  https://www.portofrotterdam.com/en/asia/why-rotterdam 
190  https://www.portofrotterdam.com/en/our-port/facts-and-figures/facts-figures-about-the-port/throughput 
191  https://www.portofrotterdam.com/en/asia/why-rotterdam
192  https://www.portofrotterdam.com/sites/default/files/facts-and-figures-port-of-rotterdam.pdf 
193  https://www.ft.com/content/b5ee770a-ced1-11e7-9dbb-291a884dd8c6 
194  https://www.portofrotterdam.com/sites/default/files/facts-and-figures-port-of-rotterdam.pdf 
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Rotterdam’s unique size and deep-sea capabilities are such that Rotterdam “is a principal point of entry 
for goods headed for destinations throughout the EU”195 from outside the EU. Approximately 55% of 
Rotterdam’s throughput is involved with goods either heading to or from non-EU states.
Rotterdam Factsheet (2017)196
TOTAL FREIGHT
• 467.4 MT 
PORT AREA
• 12,643 Ha
FREIGHT MIX
• Liquid Bulk - 
214.3 MT
• Dry Bulk - 80.2 
MT
• Containers - 
142.6 MT
• Ro-Ro — 23.8 MT
• General Cargo - 
6.5 MT
FREIGHT 
DISTRIBUTION (2016)
• Europe - 44.4%
• Africa - 10.1%
• Americas - 18.6%
• Asia - 21.2%
• Oceania - 1.8%
• Unknown - 3.7%
UK SPECIFIC FREIGHT
• 8.5% - 40 MT
UK-specific shipping to Rotterdam
While large portions of the cargo handled by Rotterdam is either liquid or dry bulk, UK specific shipping at 
Rotterdam occupies 90% of its Ro-Ro capacity and more than 55% of its short sea container capacity197. 
These kinds of cargo types, particularly Ro-Ro are far more frequent, less massive and less homogenous 
compared to liquid and dry bulk. As such any non-frictionless Brexit would create checks which are likely 
to disproportionately affect UK-Rotterdam trade. Cargo transported as part of the Rotterdam effect would 
also face being checked twice upon entry to Rotterdam and then in the UK. The Dutch Food Authority 
(NVWA) estimates that such checks would incur delays of between 20 minutes and 24 hours depending 
on the cargo and the checks necessary. 
Under EU law, checks must be done on animal or planet products leaving or entering the single market. 
When these are done in Rotterdam a lorry driver must wait while a veterinary inspector opens their cargo, 
checks the temperature and verifies the health certificates attached to the cargo. On average this process 
takes 30 minutes but if the inspector deems additional checks are necessary a sample of the cargo is sent 
for laboratory testing, which takes far longer. After Brexit, UK related goods are likely to face similar kinds 
of checks. The port itself expects that it will have to undertake 30% more import checks and 100% more 
export checks than currently198. 
How will Brexit affect Rotterdam?
Both Rotterdam and the Netherlands have a large exposure to Brexit related effects. The Netherlands and 
UK are major trade partners with approximately 54 MT of trade annually between them. Analysis by the 
Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis forecasts that even if the UK and EU strike a free-trade 
deal the Netherlands will lose 0.9% of its GDP by 2030 as a result of trade loss and disruption199.
Given that Rotterdam alone handles approximately 40 out for this 54 MT makes Rotterdam a lynchpin 
to UK-Dutch trade. A large proportion of this trade between UK ports and Rotterdam are transhipments 
where Rotterdam is used as a middle stage for non-EU exports to the UK and UK exports to outside of the 
EU. This is because Rotterdam’s advantages in terms of facilities and better accessibility often mean that 
transporting goods to the UK is cheaper and faster than doing it directly to UK ports. This re-exportation is 
often known as the ‘Rotterdam effect’ and while it happens to some extent in most ports with any trade 
coming from outside the EU’s customs union, it is particularly pronounced in Rotterdam itself. 
195  https://www.ft.com/content/b5ee770a-ced1-11e7-9dbb-291a884dd8c6
196  https://www.portofrotterdam.com/sites/default/files/facts-and-figures-port-of-rotterdam.pdf
197  https://www.womblebonddickinson.com/uk/insights/articles-and-briefings/brexit-and-port-rotterdam 
198  https://www.ft.com/content/b5ee770a-ced1-11e7-9dbb-291a884dd8c6 
199  https://www.cpb.nl/sites/default/files/omnidownload/CPB-Policy-Brief-2016-07-Brexit-costs-for-the-netherlands-arise-from-reduced-trade.pdf 
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An ONS analysis done in 2015 using trade data from 2013 theorised that this effect could involve as an 
upper bound up to 50% of Dutch exports to the UK200. While this is simply an estimate it is certainly true 
that a non-trivial amount of UK-Rotterdam trade is based on this effect. 
Checks and Delays 
There are major concerns regarding how Rotterdam can handle these checks and the delays they are likely 
to incur. High speed supply chains utilising just-in-time manufacturing are currently able to use lorries to 
make an under 24 hour round-trip to most destinations within the UK from Rotterdam201. Any delays will 
require the use of more lorries to maintain the same level of throughput, which could in turn create more 
potential traffic. Despite Rotterdam’s large site size and extensive land reclamation the port has limited 
space for queuing lorries awaiting entry. The port has warned of 9km lorry tailbacks at the port under a 
no-deal WTO scenario. 
Customs 
Customs offices at Rotterdam’s short sea port were removed in 1993 after the completion of the EU single 
market while the number of lorries transiting the port has quintupled since 1989.202 The number of new 
checks needed is unprecedented in Rotterdam’s history. Meanwhile the port estimates that 35,000 of the 
80,000 Dutch businesses which engage with the UK “have no practical experience of making customs 
declarations”203 of the type that will be needed while HMRC has estimated that 131,000 UK businesses are 
in a similar situation. Officials at the port estimate that most of Rotterdam’s own 3000 on-site businesses 
are involved with the UK in some way or another204. 
Rotterdam Port has warned that it could lose up to half of its current trade with the UK over time, in 
addition to the potential long-term economic impact to the Netherlands as a whole.205 While UK ports 
might gain if non-EU countries ship directly to UK ports rather than via Rotterdam, it is unclear if existing 
UK ports have either the capacity or facilities to manage these possible new cargo flows. This disruption 
also goes both ways, with delays at Rotterdam likely to impede UK exports to the EU, post-Brexit. For 
example, Stena Line, which operates four to five ships a day to UK ports has warned that disruption is likely 
to impact its ability to deliver food in time to the UK206.
Brexit Preparations 
The Dutch government has planned to hire 928 additional customs officials and 145 veterinary 
inspectors207. The first initial group of 150 started training in April 2018208. This number includes 100 
extra customs officers intended to be ready in Rotterdam by March 2019209. The Dutch government is also 
operating a ‘Brexit Scanner’ which allows Dutch businesses to check their readiness210. 
Apart from a wide variety of investments (e.g. in new customs posts at the port) and contingency planning 
Rotterdam is also undertaking a post-Brexit customs trial beginning in November 2018 and lasting 90 
days211. This will test customs checks including food and animal inspections as well as new IT system 
intended to better handle the new workload. The port is anticipating that this trial will create disruption 
and extra traffic as a result however this is intended to give Rotterdam a real-life view of where potential 
problems and bottlenecks will be post-Brexit. 
200 https://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-committees/PACAC/Correspondence/Sir-Andrew-Dilnot-Chair-UK-Standards-Authority-to- 
 Bernard-Jenkin-Chair-PACAC-28-04-16.pdf 
201 https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/brexit-ports-customs-union-u-turn-rotterdam-eu-trade-single-market-theresa-may-david-  
 davis-a8303436.html 
202  ttps://www.theguardian.com/business/2018/sep/22/rotterdam-prepared-for-worst-after-brexit 
203  ttps://www.womblebonddickinson.com/uk/insights/articles-and-briefings/brexit-and-port-rotterdam 
204  ttps://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/brexit-ports-customs-union-u-turn-rotterdam-eu-trade-single-market-theresa-may-david-  
 davis-a8303436.html 
205  ttps://theloadstar.co.uk/port-rotterdam-plans-post-brexit-customs-trial-discover-bottlenecks/?utm_     
 source=The+Loadstar+daily+email&utm_campaign=23fa8892a8-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2018_06_27_11_50&utm_medium=email&utm_ 
 term=0_c4570e43d4-23fa8892a8-153503493 
206  ttps://www.theguardian.com/business/2018/sep/22/rotterdam-prepared-for-worst-after-brexit 
207  ttps://www.theguardian.com/business/2018/sep/22/rotterdam-prepared-for-worst-after-brexit 
208  ttps://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/apr/27/port-of-rotterdam-infrastructure-plans-stall-amid-brexit-uncertainty 
209  ttps://www.portofrotterdam.com/en/news-and-press-releases/brexit-and-port-of-rotterdam 
210  ttps://business.gov.nl/brexit/ 
211  ttps://www.supplychaindive.com/news/Port-Rotterdam-Brexit-trial-customs/527138/ 
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In comparison, this level of planning is not being undertaken at other ports and is a testament to the 
investment that Rotterdam has put into its Brexit planning, driven by the obvious challenges both 
structurally and economically that Brexit creates. Despite this the port says that “It remains to be seen 
whether customs capacity from 2019 can handle all the extra declarations.”212
212  https://www.portofrotterdam.com/en/news-and-press-releases/brexit-and-port-of-rotterdam 
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ZEEBRUGGE, BELGIUM
Description
Although the coastline near the city of Bruges has had a coastal history almost as long as it has existed, 
Zeebrugge itself has a comparatively recent heritage213. In a period characterised by Bruges taking a role 
as a relative provincial backwater which had lost its access to the coast to nature, it was decided by the 
Belgian government in the late 1800s to construct a new port for Bruges. This port was named Zeebrugge; 
literally translated as “Bruges-by-the-sea”. Work began in 1896 and completed in 1905. By the 1960s 
Zeebrugge grew strongly based on the expansion of liquid bulk cargo such as oil and both the rise of 
roll-on / roll-off traffic and containerisation. Zeebrugge is operated by its port authority MBZ214, which was 
created with Zeebrugge’s establishment in 1895 and has the city of Bruges as its largest shareholder. 
Operational Profile
Zeebrugge is primarily both a ro-ro port and a container one; of Zeebrugge’s 37.1 MT throughput, 30.4 
MT is near-equally split between the two215. While Zeebrugge’s container throughput does not compare 
to much larger container ports, it’s ro-ro capacity occupies a substantial chunk of cross-channel traffic. 
Zeebrugge’s importance to the UK, and therefore its sensitivities to the effects of Brexit, is heightened 
by the fact that approximately 45% of Zeebrugge’s capacity is involved with UK-Belgian trade. This 
exposure, along with the general proximity of Belgium to the UK as a whole, means that Belgium, like the 
Netherlands is particular exposed to the economic effects of Brexit. 
Zeebrugge also holds a unique role as a shipping port for cars; Zeebrugge is the EU’s largest shipment 
point for completed cars, with 2.8 million typically passing through the port each year216. Of these around 
1 million are involved with the UK, making Zeebrugge a key economic node for the British car industry, 
whose reliance on modern just-in-time manufacturing methods requires logistics chains with high 
frequency and minimal delays. Zeebrugge’s role as a ro-ro port is one of the main reasons why it is utilised 
so much in this manner. 
213  https://www.portofzeebrugge.be/en/port/history 
214  https://www.portofzeebrugge.be/en/port-authority/about-us-0 
215  https://www.portofzeebrugge.be/sites/default/files/2017-12/Connect%20-%20Annual%20magazine%202017.pdf 
216  https://www.apnews.com/8459fe24a63541c78c2f4d3801be1c5c 
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For these same reasons the port is used as the sole transporter of goods into the UK for products such as 
Volvic and Evian bottled water217, as well as tens of millions of litres of Tropicana orange juice. Its owner 
Tropicana Products uses Zeebrugge as a transhipment location after the juice is shipped into the port from 
Brazil. In recent times the port has sought to encourage its use for food and drink shipping by leveraging 
both its ease of access and position as a so-called non-industrial ‘clean port’ for perishable items. 
Zeebrugge Factsheet (2017)218
TOTAL FREIGHT
• 37.1 MT
PORT AREA
• Approx 550 Ha
FREIGHT MIX
• Liquid Bulk - 4.1 
MT
• Dry Bulk - 1.3 MT
• Containers - 15.4 
MT
• Ro-Ro — 15 MT
• General Cargo - 
1.3 MT
FREIGHT 
DISTRIBUTION
• Europe - 79%
• Asia - 10%
• Americas - 5% 
• Other - 5%
UK SPECIFIC FREIGHT
• Approx 45% - 
16.7 MT
How will Brexit affect Zeebrugge?
Because large portions of Zeebrugge’s throughput is devoted to both ro-ro traffic and UK trade, the port’s 
sensitivities to Brexit are particularly high. Approximately 4,000 lorries drive from Zeebrugge to the UK 
each day219 with the port warning that delays due to customs checks or knock-on traffic from the UK or 
elsewhere could lead to tens of miles of traffic leading from the port. 
Currently, checks on non-EU countries are done similarly to other ports via a statistical sampling system 
which selects shipments for inspection; these checks are done on around 1.5% of all non-EU cargo220. 
Brexit will likely extend these kinds of checks towards UK cargo as well, increasing burdens on the ports 
customs checks and raising the likelihood of delays. Additionally all post-Brexit UK freight will require a 
larger and more detailed collection of customs documentation than currently. Due to its membership of 
the EU Customs Union UK freight currently only needs to provide general categorisations of the cargo 
being carried, something which is not allowed for third country freight. 
Under a no-deal Brexit, Zeebrugge would be particularly affected by the 10% tariffs that the WTO imposes 
on cars as well as high tariffs on some particular food and drink items. This tariff increase could lead to 
higher prices as car manufacturers try to protect relatively slim profit margins. Such changes could also 
depress investment if manufacturers can no longer justify the capital costs of updating factories or creating 
new ones. One business, ICO shipping, which handles around half of the one million UK related cars 
passing through Zeebrugge has seen shipping reduce by 15% since 2016 as a result of uncertainty. The 
company further warns that another 20% (100,000) might be lost in the event of a no-deal Brexit221. 
Brexit Preparations 
Despite these difficulties and the warnings that the port has produced, it has also stated that it has 
made progress in its preparations. Zeebrugge has accelerated the introduction of apps and scanners to 
reduce the burdens of potential paperwork, with the intention to digitise the customs process as much 
as possible. Due the importance of the UK to Zeebruge the port has also been undertaking “a UK-specific 
programme for every stage of the logistics chain”222 with the objective to allow prepared lorries to pass the 
customs checks before they appear at the port itself. The port is also encouraging operators to apply for 
schemes such as the Authorised Economic Operator (AEO)223 which are intended to reduce paperwork for 
businesses which meet the correct standards. 
217 https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/oct/07/zeebrugge-brexit-braced-for-tariffs-trade-loss 
218 https://www.portofzeebrugge.be/en/port/facts-and-figures 
219 https://www.apnews.com/8459fe24a63541c78c2f4d3801be1c5c 
220 http://europe.autonews.com/article/20180521/ANE/180529957/the-brexit-bottleneck:-how-freight-could-get-stuck-at-the-border 
221 https://www.apnews.com/8459fe24a63541c78c2f4d3801be1c5c 
222 https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/oct/07/zeebrugge-brexit-braced-for-tariffs-trade-loss 
223 https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/general-information-customs/customs-security/authorised-economic-operator-aeo/authorised-  
 economic-operator-aeo_en 
74
The Belgian government has also announced that it is in the process of hiring and training an extra 141 
customs officials for the port224. Officials at the port have also stated that there is a potential for checks 
to encourage more businesses to use Zeebrugge’s ro-ro facilities instead of Calais because Zeebrugge is 
capable of operating ‘people-free’ ro-ro where no drivers need to go through UK border controls225. In 
the longer term, the port is hoping to focus more on markets farther afield, with the authorities citing 
growth in trade from countries such as Turkey, Iran and China. In July a freight train carried Volvo cars 
from China to the port for the first time226 under the Chinese Belt and Road initiative, with the port then 
shipping them onto the rest of the world. 
The European Commission has also sought to encourage new shipping routes between Ireland and ports 
such as Zeebrugge so as to reduce Irish dependence on cargo transported through the UK. Under the 
European Commission’s proposed 2021 - 2027 budget for example, €30.6 billion would be assigned to 
the EU’s Connecting Europe Facilities, with ports such as Zeebrugge, Antwerp and Rotterdam able to bid 
for this funding227. The port of Dublin has also upgraded its facilities to accommodate the new ship MV 
Celine, which is the world’s largest ro-ro vessel228. Both Zeebrugge and Rotterdam are intended to be used 
by the Celine. 
224  https://www.portofzeebrugge.be/en/business/business-logistics/brexit 
225  https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/oct/07/zeebrugge-brexit-braced-for-tariffs-trade-loss 
226  https://www.flandersinvestmentandtrade.com/invest/en/news/first-ever-chinese-vehicle-train-reaches-port-zeebrugge 
227  https://www.politico.eu/article/brexit-french-ireland-ports-cut-out-of-eu-trade-route-after-brexit/ 
228  https://www.thejournal.ie/ship-launching-celine-dublin-port-3969187-Apr2018/ 
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ANNEXES 
Annex 1
https://www.nao.org.uk/report/the-uk-border-preparedness-for-eu-exit/
76
Annex 2
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https://www.nao.org.uk/report/the-uk-border-preparedness-for-eu-exit/
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